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CHAPTER 1 
Valuation Errors at the Time of Security Issuance and 
the Market Timing Theory of Capital Structure 
A. Introduction 
Over the years, several theories regarding the determinants of capital structure 
have been posited and tested. Starting in 1959, Modigliani and Miller were the first to 
address the capital structure issue in a scientific way. Under very strict assumptions they 
showed that in a world without taxes the value of the firm and its cost of capital are 
unaffected by its capital structure, i.e. capital structure is irrelevant to the value ofthe 
firm. Later, in 1963 they relaxed the no tax assumption and concluded that the value of 
the firm is increased by the use ofleverage because interest on debt is a deductible 
expense. Although, the M&M models do not apply to realistic market conditions, after 
all no firm will have 100% leverage in order to fully maximize the benefits of a tax 
shield, they instigated the start of an extensive line of research in the area of capital 
structure. 
Up till this date the firm's capital structure choice has basically been tackled in 
three main theories. First, the pecking order theory in which the firm will issue the 
cheapest securities first which usually implies that the firm prefers to use internal to 
external financing, and debt to equity financing (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Second, the static tradeofftheory in which a firm makes gradual adjustments over time 
toward an optimal target capitaLstructure. Third, the market timing theory (Baker and 
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Wurgler, 2002), in which capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to 
time the equity market. The purpose of this essay is to extent the research in capital 
structure by further examining the market timing hypothesis. 
Recent literatures suggest that the debt/equity choice is based on factors other 
than a target capital structure. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find evidence that 
suggests target capital structure considerations are much more important when firms 
repurchase securities rather than issue, and that stock prices play an important role in 
determining a firm's financing choice. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that current capital 
structure is strongly related to past market values. Their results are most consistent with 
the market-timing hypothesis of capital structure, which asserts that capital structure is 
the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. 
In this paper the robustness of the market timing hypothesis of capital structure is 
tested simultaneously against the pecking order and static trade off theories. The method 
used is similar to D'Mello and Shroff (2000) in their analysis of misvaluation for firms 
making stock repurchases. First, I test whether misvaluation of equity is a significant 
determinant in the security issuance decision, after controlling for the factors that proxy 
for the static trade off theory and pecking order theory of capital structure. In addition to 
the debt/equity choice, management must also make a decision between public issuance 
and private placement. Many previous studies have examined the debt vs. equity choice 
or the private vs. public placement decision separately. Typically, most of these studies 
analyze the abnormal return patterns around the announcement day to determine whether 
asymmetric information is the driving force behind the issuance decision. By following 
the D'Mello and Shroff method this study instead uses a direct measure of valuation that 
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allows for separating out those firms that are over and under valued. The intent of the 
paper is to extend the existing literature on capital structure, and in particular the market 
timing hypothesis, by examining valuation effects on the debt-equity choice, as well as 
the public-private placement choice. The results are most consistent with the market 
timing hypothesis of capital structure, however, the results do not provide evidence that 
there is a single model of capital structure that dominates in the security issuance 
decision. 
Second, a model designed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) to test the pecking 
order hypothesis, and more recently extended by Frank and Goyal (2003) is examined. 
Specifically, the model analyzes the relationship between net debt issues and the firm's 
financing deficit. The pecking order theory implies a close to one-to-one relationship 
between these variables. Shyam-Sunder and Myers find evidence in support of the 
pecking order hypothesis, while Frank and Goyal's results are less supportive of pecking 
order. The Frank and Goyal result is explored in light of market timing and the evidence 
indicates that the sensitivity of debt issues to the financing deficit is directly related to the 
degree to which equity is overvalued. Using Frank and Goyal's version of the SSM 
model, the financing deficit variable is interacted with a measure of valuation. For this 
sample of issuing firms, it appears that the deviation from a one-to-one result found by 
FG is primarily driven by misvaluation. The results are more consistent with the Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) market timing hypothesis. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section B reviews the literature and develops the 
hypotheses, Section C discusses the data and method, Section D reports the results and is 
followed by concluding remarks in Section E. 
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B. Capital Structure Theories; Literature Review 
1. Pecking Order Theory 
A firm's security issuance choice is often explained by the pecking order theory. 
In a pecking order framework a firm avoids issuing equity due to high asymmetric 
information surrounding this security, compared to its alternatives. Firms therefore 
prefer to use internal before external financing, and debt before equity financing. In an 
attempt to solve the capital structure puzzle Myers (1984) developed the following 
pecking order for making financing decisions. 
l. Firms prefer internal sources of funds. 
2. Firms adapt their dividend payout policies to reflect their anticipated investment 
opportunities, although dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are only 
gradually adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment opportunities. · 
3. Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and 
investment opportunities; mean that internally generated cash flows may be more 
or less than investment outlays. If it is less, the firm draws down its cash balance 
or marketable securities portfolio. If it is more, the firm pays off debt or invests 
in cash or marketable securities. If the surplus persists, the firm may gradually 
increase its target payout ratio. 
4. If external financing is required, firms issue the safest security first: They start 
with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then possibly 
equity as last resort. 
Important implications of the Myers pecking order theory are the following; (a) 
the firm has no target debt/equity ratio; (b) there are two types of equity, internal and 
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external, with the former having priority for new financing and the later being a last 
resort; and ( c) as a consequence, each firm's debt/equity mix reflects its cumulative 
requirements for external financing. In summary, according to the pecking order theory a 
firm's financing mix is just the result of its past profitability, dividend policy, and 
investment opportunities. Myers finds empirical support for the pecking order theory, 
however he points out that this is merely a description of companies' financing behavior 
and it does not explain why such behavior may be optimal or even desirable. 
One theoretical explanation for the observed pecking order behavior is offered by 
the literature on managerial capitalism. This theory asserts that managers would rather 
use internal than external sources of funds in order to avoid disciplinary actions of the 
capital market. 1 A second rationale for pecking order behavior may be found in the 
notion of maximizing shareholders wealth. The costs associated with issuing new 
securities might reduce existing shareholders' wealth, especially when managers have 
more favorable information about the firm's future cash flows than do investors. A large 
body of finance literature based on this idea of asymmetric information has provided a 
strong foundation for the pecking order theory. In an environment where firm managers 
and(future) investors do not have the same information about the firm's future cash 
flows, the firm's equity may be substantially undervalued. If managers faced with this 
situation act on behalf of existing shareholders, they would choose to issue debt instead 
of equity after they have exhausted their internal financing capacity. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) developed an equilibrium model of the issue-investment 
decision under the assumptions that firm managers have superior asymmetric 
1 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a discussion on capital structure and agency costs. 
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information, which they cannot credibly reveal to the market, and that issuance of new 
equity is their only source of funding for the new project. They show that under certain 
conditions managers may decide to forego a positive NPV project, rather than issue 
equity. The other side of this argument suggests that if managers decide to issue equity, 
they must perceive this equity to be significantly overvalued. Investors realize this and 
therefore the value of the firm is expected to decrease after the announcement of a firm's . 
plan to issue equity. A dynamic version of the pecking order theory postulates that firm 
managers may choose to issue equity when asymmetric information is low in order to 
build financial slack for future investment opportunities. Consistent with the pecking 
order theory are the early studies by Masulis and Korwar (1986), Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986). They observe that issues of seasoned equity 
are interpreted as bad news by investors. They find significantly negative announcement 
date effects on equity prices. Other researchers have studied the effects of debt issues on 
·. stock prices using the argument that issuance of new debt should reduce the information 
asymmetry.2 However, they did not find significant positive cumulative returns. Masulis 
(1980) looked at debt for equity and equity for debt exchanges and found significant 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for both cases. Although the CARs had the 
expected opposite signs, they were of a different magnitude which provided evidence in 
favor the Myers and Majluf signaling hypothesis. In general, these empirical studies 
indicate that leverage increasing capital structure changes have a positive impact on firm 
value, while leverage decreasing capital structure changes have a negative impact on a 
2 See Dann and Mikkelson (1984) and Eckbo (1986). 
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firm's stock price or value. The empirical findings in these studies support the pecking 
order theory. 3 Many other studies have utilized the asymmetric information theory in 
order to explain the choice between public issuance or private placement of both debt and 
equity. The general consensus is that corporations issue equity in the public market place 
when the market overvalues this equity and issue other forms of securities when equity is 
undervalued. In general, empirical studies show that issuance of public equity generates 
a share price drop in the order of 3% and firms that issue public debt have abnormal 
returns that are not significantly different from zero.4 On the other hand, empirical 
studies concerning the placements of private equity and debt document significant 
positive retums.5 
Cooney and Kalay (1993) extend the Myers and Majluf (1984) study by allowing 
for negative NPV projects. They show that the rejection of a project does not necessarily 
mean undervaluation of equity, but might simply be because it is a bad project. Hertzel 
. and Smith (1993) modify the Myers and Majluf framework by adding private placement 
of equity as an additional source of capital acquisition. They show that private placement 
of equity by undervalued firms can alleviate the costs associated with asymmetric 
information, therefore corporations might choose private placement over public issuance 
3 See Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) for a development of models where choice of capital 
structure is used to signal information to (potential) investor. 
4 Frank and Goyal (2000) find non-significant impact on stock prices for debt issues. Eckbo (1986) reports 
non-significant abnormal returns for straight debt issues, but significant negative effects when convertible 
debt is issued. 
5 Szewczyk and Varma (1991) report the stock price effects of announcements of private debt placements 
for a sample of public utilities and find that the issuance of private debt is associated with significantly 
positive abnormal returns. Hertzel and Smith (1993), and Wruck (1989) document significant positive 
returns after private equity announcements. Goh, Gombola, Lee, and Liu (1999) examine earnings forecast 
revisions by analysts after the announcement of private equity placements by firms. Their findings suggest 
that positive stock price reactions are explained by favorable information on improved short-term earnings 
prospects for the firm. 
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when it enables existing shareholders to retain a larger fraction of the firm. They report 
significant positive abnormal returns associated with the announcement of privately 
placed equity. 6 Empirically, the pecking order theory has been tested extensively, but the 
results are mixed and there is no conclusive evidence that pecking order better describes 
financing behavior than does the static trade off theory of capital structure. 
2. Static Tradeoff Theory 
In a static tradeoff framework, firm managers try to sustain an optimal target 
capital structure. A firm will substitute debt for equity or equity for debt until the value of 
the firm is maximized and the optimal capital structure is obtained. This optimal is 
determined by considering the tradeoffs between the benefits (interest tax shields) and 
costs ( costs of financial distress) of debt. However, random events within or outside the 
firm may temporarily shift the corporation away from its optimal target. Assuming that 
the target capital structure is stable, one would expect to see mean reverting behavior 
with regard to the debt/equity mix, i.e., the level of debt ratio is not driven by the need for 
external funds but is the result of trying to obtain the optimal level of debt. 
In more recent studies the pecking order model is tested against the static tradeoff 
theory. Syam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examine debt financing patterns through time to 
test which theory best describes the observed data for mature public companies. Their 
results indicate that the pecking order model explains more of the time series variance in 
actual debt-ratios than a target adjustment model. First, they regress financing deficit on 
the amount of net debt. In testing the sensitivity of changes in net debt to a firm's 
6 For more extensions of the Myers and Majlufmodel see also Krasker (1986), Brennan and Kraus (1987), 
Noe (1988), Narayanan (1988), and Zechner (1990). 
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financing deficit, the pecking order theory implies a close to one-to-one relation. Second, 
to test the target adjustment model net debt is regressed on the difference between the 
firm's target and actual debt. Both models prove to explain the variation in net debt, 
although the pecking order model seems to be a far better fit. When both specifications 
are nested into one model, the target adjustment coefficient still remains significant, but 
again the pecking order variable seems superior in explaining changes in the debt ratio. 
In addition, they test both models on simulated data based on the pecking order or the 
conditional target model. The pecking order model can be easily rejected when false, 
while the target adjustment model cannot be rejected, even when false. In summary, their 
results indicate that pecking order theory better describes firms' financing behavior than 
does the static trade off theory. Chrinko and Singha (2000) refute the Syam-
Sunder/Myers result by pointing out that the pecking order model used is not an identity 
due to excluding the equity issues from the financing hierarchy. Consequently, their 
model tests a joint hypothesis of the financing hierarchy and the proportion of equity 
issued. Frank and Goyal (2003) also examine the Syam-Sunder/Myers result and report 
contrary results. They find that net equity issues have a far closer relation with financing 
deficit than do net debt issues, and therefore reject the pecking order theory. They also 
report evidence of mean reversion in debt levels, consistent with the tradeoff theory. 
Researchers have not been able to conclusively identify one single model of capital 
structure that dominates in the security issuance choice. 
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3. Market Timing Theory 
A survey of 392 CFOs by Graham and Harvey (2000) finds limited support for 
the pecking order and tradeofftheories. According to this survey, market timing seems to 
be a more important aspect in corporate :financial policy. In support of that view 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find evidence that suggests that capital structure 
considerations are much more important when firms repurchase securities rather than 
issue, and that stock prices play an important role in determining a firm's financing 
choice. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that current capital structure is strongly related to 
past market values. These results are more consistent with the market-timing theory of 
capital structure. 
Timing of debt and equity offers appears to be an important factor when 
management makes decisions about acquiring additional external capital. 7 Past research 
has focused on several determinants in an attempt to explain this timing behavior. One 
argument for the timing of equity offers is that during periods of economic expansion 
more profitable investment opportunities are available. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) 
reason that the adverse selection effects of equity issuance a firm faces during these 
expansions will be smaller than during contractions, resulting in a higher frequency of 
equity offering during expansions. Indeed, their evidence indicates that the frequency of 
equity offers relative to debt offers rises during these periods. Korajczyk, Lucas and 
McDonald (1991) argue that asymmetric information has implications for the timing of 
equity issues. They look at the arrival of information using earnings releases and find 
7 See Graham and Harvey (2001 ). 
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that time varying adverse selection affects timing and pricing of equity issues. The stock 
price fall at equity issue announcements is increasing in time since the last information 
release. If a firm delays the issue of equity by one month after the last information 
release, on average the stock price will suffer an additional loss of 0.44%. Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996) link the decision to issue equity with the cost of equity in order to 
search for 'windows of opportunity' during which it is most favorable for a firm to issue 
equity. They find evidence for the existence of high volume equity markets (hot markets) 
and low volume equity markets ( cold markets). Their results indicate that average price 
reactions in hot markets are significantly less negative, while price reactions in cold 
markets are significantly more negative than at other times. Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) 
use actual long-term post issue abnormal returns as a proxy for management's 
expectations of future performance to compare the agency, pecking order, and timing 
model. Although their results find support for the agency and pecking order model, the 
timing model finds almost no support at all. 
· In a more recent study, Bal<:er and Wurgler (2002) use market-to-book ratios to 
look at the impact of market timing in the short-run and long-run. 8 They report evidence 
that low leverage firms issue securities when market values, i.e., market-to-book values, 
are high and high leverage firms issue when market values are low. They interpret their 
results such that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the 
equity market. They offer two possible explanations for this view on capital structure. 
The first, consistent with the Myers and Majluf asymmetric information hypothesis 
8 In a previous paper Baker and Wurgler (2000) also found evidence in support of the timing hypothesis 
using aggregate equity and debt issue data from 1927-1996. 
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assuming rational managers and investors, reasons that adverse selection may vary across 
firms or time and is inversely related to market-to-book ratio. Firms do not revert to their 
target capital structure because the costs of not doing so are small. The second theory 
assumes that managers believe that they can time the equity. Managers use market-to-
book ratio as a proxy for misvaluation by investors and issue equity when they perceive 
that investors have overvalued the firm. The evidence from long-run studies of equity 
issuance supports the market timing hypothesis rather than the asymmetric information 
hypothesis.9 
4. Measuring Misvaluation 
A key problem with the studies of misvaluation is that they utilize market-to-book 
as the measure ofmisvaluation. Indeed, Baker and Wurgler (2002) recognize that this 
variable also is interpreted as a measure of growth opportunities. In order to separate out 
growth opportunities from over-valuation it is necessary to call upon long run studies 
which relate market-to-book to long run returns and generally find that high market-to-
book firms tend to underperform low market-to-book firms (La Porta, 1996; Frankel and 
Lee, 1998). Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) find that market-to-book ratios explain 
about 0.33% of the variation in the real return in the Dow 30 stocks over a one to 18 
month time horizon. They conclude that market-to-book ratios really have little 
economic predictability of stock returns. This result is broadly consistent with Kothari 
and Shanken (1997) who find that while market-to-book ratios have some predictive 
9 See Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
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power over the 1926-1991 time period, their predictivity is substantially reduced in the 
1946-1991 subperiod. Instead of market-to-book ratios, Lee et al. find that a valuation 
measure that incorporates time-varying interest rates and earnings (the residual income 
model) has significant predictive ability ( over 20% of the variation in the real return of 
the Dow 30) and is therefore arguably a far better measure of misvaluation. 
D'Mello and Shroff (2000) use the residual income model to estimate the intrinsic 
value of the stock compared to the market price as a measure of misvaluation, and find 
that firms that repurchase equity securities via tender offers are undervalued. Jindra 
(2000) uses a similar method and finds firms issuing seasoned equity are significantly 
overvalued. This paper seeks to examine directly the impact of equity valuation relative 
to price on the security issuance decision by using a residual income model to measure 
equity value. This approach has the advantage over the use of market-to-book ratios in 
that it allows us to separate out the effects of growth opportunities, asymmetric 
information and pure inisvaluation, which cannot be achieved through the use of market-
to-book ratios alone. I then aim to examine the choice of securities in light of the extant 
theories of capital structure, including the market timing hypothesis, using this method of 
measuring misvaluation. 
The analysis has three basic approaches. The first approach will seek to determine 
what, if any valuation differences in equity exist for different types of security issuance. 
In the analysis a sample of public debt, private debt and public equity issuances will be 
studied.1° Consistent with market timing, the expectation is that firms issue equity when 
equity is most overvalued. When equity is undervalued I would expect the firm to issue 
10 Due to paucity of data on companies issuing equity in the private market, these issues are omitted from 
the analysis. 
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debt securities. Second, the security issuance decision is modeled as a function of 
misvaluation and proxies for factors that would lead to security issuances based upon the 
pecking order and static trade off theories. In essence, I am running a horse race in which 
all theories have an opportunity to reveal their relative impact on the security issuance 
decision. As a result, the study is not restricted to finding results in favor of just one 
theory- it is perfectly plausible that all the theories may be operating together at some 
time. Third, the Frank and Goyal (2003) study is extended by including a direct measure 
ofmisvaluation. If the degree ofmisvaluation determines the security decision choice the 
expectation is to see the relation between net debt and financing deficit to be much 
stronger for undervalued firms than for overvalued firms, i.e. overvalued firms are more 
likely to issue equity, while undervalued firms issue debt. The following section 
discusses the data and method, specifically the variables used to capture the various 
capital structure theories. 
C. Data and Method 
1. Sample Selection 
The initial sample consists of all non-financial, U.S. firms that issued public 
seasoned equity, public non-convertible debt, and private non-convertible debt, during 
the period 1981-1999. Financial companies are excluded from the sample due to the 
highly regulated environment in which they operate. File/issue dates and issue specific 
variables are obtained from Securities Data Corporation's (SOC) Global New Issues 
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database11 . All firms are required to have relevant data available on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) and Standard and Poor's Research Insight 
annual database (COMPUSTAT). Further, issuances of firms with multiple offers during 
the sample period must be separated by at least three years. In the event that there are 
less than three years between offers, only the first issue is allowed into the sample.12 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics by Year 
Total sample of all U.S. non-financial firms with the required data available on CRSP and 
COMPUST AT issuing public equity, public non-convertible debt or private non-
convertible debt between January 1981 and December 1999. Issues done by the same 
company in the subsequent 10 days after the issue date are combined into one issue. Issues 
done by the same company within three years of the issue date, but not in the subsequent 
ten days are deleted from the sample. 
Total number 
Year of issues Public egui!X Public debt Private debt 
1981 5 3 0 2 
1982 135 73 29 33 
1983 143 110 14 19 
1984 39 16 6 17 
1985 96 31 39 26 
1986 113 40 39 34 
1987 76 38 11 27 
1988 86 14 16 56 
1989 95 32 18 45 
1990 90 26 20 44 
1991 145 68 38 39 
1992 123 54 50 19 
1993 129 64 39 26 
1994 88 40 24 24 
1995 114 56 30 28 
1996 129 59 46 24 
1997 117 59 34 24 
1998 111 43 49 19 
1999 31 5 26 0 
Total 1865 831 528 506 
11 The file date is used as the issue announcement date. Random sampling from the sample revealed that 
the announcement date falls on or within one day of the file date. For those firms where the file date 
cannot be obtained, mostly private debt issues, the issue date is used. 
12 Except in the case of multiple debt issues that occur within 10 days, in which case the proceeds of the 
issues are combined and the first file date is used. 
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The valuation model requires one year of accounting data ( from COMPUSTAT) prior to, 
and at least three years after the announcement date. In unreported results the valuation 
model is also estimated using four and five years of data following the issue date. 13 The 
market price is the average of the closing price (CRSP) for the two days prior to the 
announcement date. The total sample contains 1865 security issuances which are divided 
into the following three sub-samples; (1) 831 public equity issues, (2) 528 public debt 
issues, and (3) 506 issues of private debt. Table 1 shows the number of issues for each 
type of security for each year of the sample. 
The number of public equity issues ranges from a low of 14 in 1988 to a high of 
110 in 1983 .14 Public debt issues range from 6 in 1984 to 50 in 1992, while private debt 
issues range from 17 in 1985 to 56 in 1988. 
2. Variables to Control for the Market Timing Hypothesis 
The key variable required to measure the market timing theory is some measure 
of over or under valuation at the time of security issuance. Other studies that have 
examined this theory have relied on post issue returns, market activity or market-to-book 
ratios to proxy for misvaluation. In this paper misvaluation is directly measured using 
the method employed by D'Mello and Shroff (2000) and Jindra (2001) who use the ratio 
of intrinsic value to current market price. Use of this valuation ratio has several 
advantages. First, there is no need to rely on the market model and the well documented 
potential problems relating to the use of daily stock returns in event studies can be 
avoided.15 Second, previous literature has not only documented abnormal performance in 
the short-run, but also in the long run. The residual income model allows for capturing 
13 The results for the four and five year valuation model are qualitatively similar to the reported results. 
14 1981 and 1999 actually have fewer issues in the sample simply because of data constraints. 
15 See Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), Corrado and Zivney (1992), and MacKinlay (1997) for a detailed 
discussion on the use of daily stock returns in event studies. 
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both, short run and long run effects. Last, assuming perfect foresight by managers allows 
the use of ex-post data, avoiding reliance on estimates used in event study methodology. 
I do acknowledge that using ex-post data does not exempt me from the possibility that 
management may manipulate accounting data and therefore influence the results. 
However, this problem is ameliorated in two different ways. First, the valuation ratio is 
scaled by a similar ratio computed for a matching firm (matched on 3-digit SIC code and 
market capitalization). 16 Second, the valuation ratio is scaled by the average valuation 
ratio for the subject firm from the two years prior to the issue. 
To find the intrinsic value of the security, a residual income model (RIM) is 
utilized using perfect foresight as adopted by D'Mello and Shroff (2000), and Jindra 
(2000). Jindra points out that evidence indicates that the valuation techniques based on 
earnings yield lower valuation errors compared to those based on dividends or cash 
flows. 17 Ohlson (1990, 1991, 1995) demonstrates that the use of the Residual Income 
Model is identical to the use of the Dividend Discount Model in determining the value of 
equity. However, the use of accounting numbers in the RIM makes the model easier for 
practical implementation. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) examine the intrinsic 
value of the Dow 30 stocks and provide evidence that VIP ratios, where Vis based on a 
residual income valuation model, have more predictive power in forecasting future 
returns than book-to-market ratios (BIP), earnings-to-price ratios (EIP), and dividend 
yield (DIP). 
16 The capitalization of the matching firm must be within 200% of the sample firm's capitalization. If a 3-
digit match is not found a 2-digit match is used. Further, it is a requirement that the matching firm does not 
issue any type of security within 250 trading-days around the file/issue date. 
17 See Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Penman and Sougiannis (1998), Kim and Ritter (1999). 
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In the Residual Income Model, equity value estimates are based on future realized 
earnings performance. The basic model determines the intrinsic value by adding to book 
value the discounted expected earnings in excess of normal return on book value. 
(1) 
Where TV, the terminal value, is calculated as 
TV =E[(Xo+r -r*Bo+r-1 )+(Xo+T+l -r*Ba+r)]/2 (2) 
In this definition E(V0) is the value of the firm's equity at time zero, Bo is the 
book value at time zero, r is the cost of equity, and Xi are the firms earnings at time zero 
plus i. Time zero is the time at the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the file 
date, and T equals two years. 
The cost of equity, r, uses the Fama and French (1997) method in which each firm 
is assigned the cost of equity of one of forty-eight industry groups computed using the 
Fama French three factor model.18 The short-term T-bill is used as a proxy for the risk-
free rate of interest. Lee et aL(1999) report that both the use of short-term T-Bill rates 
and the long-term Treasury bonds rates are useful proxies, however estimates of V based 
on the short-term T-Bill rate outperform those based on the long-term T-bond rates 
because they have a lower standard deviation and a faster rate of mean reversion. Similar 
to D'Mello and Shroff (2000) TV is calculated as the average of the last two years of the 
18 A fixed risk premium approach as in Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) is also used in the 
computation of E(V0) and generates similar results. 
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finite series and is restricted to be nonnegative. The estimated intrinsic value of the stock 
is then compared to the market value of the stock at the file/issue date to determine the 
misvaluation error. Estimated misvaluation is measured as, 
(3) 
Where Mo represents the estimated misvaluation at time zero, Po represents the 
market price of the stock at time zero, and VO represents the intrinsic value of the stock at 
time zero. The estimated misvaluation measure of the sample firm is scaled by two 
different benchmarks. First, the sample valuation ratio is scaled by a similar ratio 
computed for a matching firm, called SMVP (sample match firm value price ratio). The 
match is based on the 3-digit SIC code and market capitalization. Second, the sample 
firm is scaled by a time-series benchmark, as shown in Equation 4, where Mo-1 and Mo-2 
are the misvaluation measures for the two years prior to the issue. 
TSVP0 = Mo 
[Mo-2 +Mo-1]/2 
(4) 
If no misvaluation is present, SMVP/TSVP should equal 1. If SMVP /TSVP is 
less than one, I interpret this as an indication that the sample firm is over-valued. A 
SMVP/TSVP value greater than one indicates a firm that is under-valued. 
3. Variables to Capture the Pecking Order and Static Tradeof!Theories 
The static trade off theory is captured with a measure of deviation from the firm's 
target ratio, calculated as the firm's current debt ratio minus the average debt ratio over 
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the past ten years. 19 If firms have indeed an optimal debt-equity ratio, managers' 
decisions with regard to security issuance are expected to be based on the deviations from 
the optimal target, i.e. when the debt-equity ratio is above the optimal target managers are 
more likely to issue equity, and vise versa when the debt ratio is below the target. To 
control for those firms that are below their target debt level but may have low debt 
capacity, the times interest earned ratio of operating profit divided by interest expense is 
also included. The expectation is that firms with low TIE ratios issue equity. 
Assuming rational investors, the dynamic version of the pecking order theory 
predicts equity issuance only when asymmetric information is low. Assuming that to be 
true, high levels of valuation errors as predicted by the timing hypothesis are not 
expected. Therefore high levels of misvaluation are not expected to be consistent with 
the pecking order theory, as these imply higher asymmetric information. Also, the 
dividend payout rate is included as a measure of the level of asymmetric information. 
This assumes that higher dividend paying firms tend to be more transparent than non-
dividend paying firms and would therefore issue equity. Firms with high levels of 
intangibles are also likely to have higher levels of information problems and are likely to 
prefer internal financing, or debt financing over equity. As an additional measure of 
uncertainty, the variance of returns for the year prior to the issue is included. Firms with 
greater stock return volatility are expected to issue debt over equity. Firms that have 
greater levels of internal free cash flow are able to finance projects through internal 
equity. Therefore, it is expected to be less likely that these firms issue equity. 
19 See Paul Marsh (1982) for a discussion on the use of the deviation from target ratio in order to control for 
the trade off theory. 
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4. Variables to Extend the Frank and Goyal Model 
To further examine the evidence against the pecking order theory provided by 
Frank and Goyal (2003), their model is extended to include a direct measure of valuation 
that allows for differentiation between over and under-valued companies. In testing the 
sensitivity of changes in debt to a firm's financing deficit the pecking order theory 
implies a nearly one-to-one relationship. However, Frank and Goyal find that the 
relationship is significantly less than one. They interpret this as evidence against the 
pecking order theory. The financing deficit variable is interacted with a measure of 
valuation. More specifically, the interaction takes the form of bifurcating the financing 
deficit variable, i.e. those for firms that are under-valued and those for firms that are 
over-valued. Similar to Frank and Goyal, net debt is then regressed on the interacted 
financing deficit variables and the conventional leverage variables (tangibles, market-to-
book, the log of net sales and profitability).20 If managers do not attempt to time the 
market, the coefficient on both financing deficit variables should be equal. However, if 
the degree ofmisvaluation influences the security decision choice, i.e., firm managers 
time the market, one would expect to see the relationship between net debt and financing 
deficit to be much stronger for under-valued firms than for overvalued firms. However, it 
should be noted that the sample in this study differs markedly from either, the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers or the Frank and Goyal samples in that this sample only contains firms 
that issued securities. It is not expected for this feature to systematically bias the results. 
20As defined in the Frank and Goyal regression the differences of the independent variables are used in the 
estimation. However, since market value of equity is included in the measure of mis-valuation the change 




1. The Security Decision Choice 
Figure I presents the mean valuation ratios on a per share basis of the three sub-
samples for the four years around the security issuance. Public equity is clearly 
overvalued at the issue year and decreases in value the subsequent two years which is 
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equity. Both, public debt and private debt are fairly valued relative to the prior two years. 
The small increase in value after the issue year supports the evidence that in general 
announcements of debt issues are perceived as positive news. 
Panel A of Table II presents summary statistics for the full sample. The mean 
(median) valuation ratio (SVP) for the sample firms is 0.71 (0.64). When SVP is scaled 
by the matching firm valuation ratio (SMVP), the mean and median is 1.15 and 0.97, 
respectively. Scaling by the average valuation ratio for the sample firm during the two 
years prior to the issue (TSVP) yields an average (median) of 1.08 (1.01). Long-term 
debt as a percent of total assets (Debtrat) ranges from Oto 83 percent with an average of 
23 percent. The current level of long-term debt minus the average long-term debt for the 
prior ten years (Debtdev) is-0.01 on average and varies from-0.47 to 0.56. The mean 
(median) free cash flow for the year prior to the issue was -$29 million ($3 million). 
Intangible assets as a percent of total assets amounted to 7 (1) percent on average 
(median). 
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The average firm is 22 years old (Age), while the youngest and oldest are 1 and 
74 years of age, respectively. On average the firms have 55 million shares outstanding 
(SO), a market capitalization of $2.4 billion (MV), and a $30.34 share price (PRC). The 
average (median) proceeds raised by the issue was $84 ($50) million. 
Table II 
Summary Statistics for Issuing Firms 
The summary statistics are computed using annual data from 1980 to 2000. SVP is defined as the 
intrinsic value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to 
calculate the intrinsic value. SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day 
average prior to the file/issue date. MVP is the variable for the matching firms and is defined similarly 
as above. SMVP is computed as SVP divided by MVP. LnSMVP is the log of SMVP. TSVP is 
defmed as SVP divided by the average of SVP in relative year -1 and -2. LnTSVP is the log of 
TSVP. DebtRat is long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6). DebtDev is computed as the 
deviation between the company's current debt ratio (long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets 
(D6)) prior to the file/issue date and its target debt ratio ( estimated by computing the average debt ratio 
over the previous 10 years prior to the file/issue date). RetVar is the average daily variance of the 
stock over the year prior to the file/issue date. FCF is free cash flow computed as income before extra 
ordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus cash dividends minus additions to fixed assets 
(d123+d125-d127-d128) ($ millions). Intangibles are obtained from COMPUSTAT and are scaled by 
total assets (D33/D6). DivRat is the payout dividend ratio (d26/d58). ShrBase is the shareholder base 
computed as the number of shares outstanding divided by the number of shareholders 
(d25*1000/d100) (thousands). Proceeds are the total proceeds from the issue defined ($million). Age 
is the number of years the issuing firm exists. Tie is times interest earned. MV is the market value 
obtained from CRSP prior to the file/issue date ($million). SO is the number of shares outstanding 
obtained from CRSP prior to the file/issue date in (millions). 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics for Full Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
SVP 1865 0.71 0.33 0.64 0.25 2.00 
MVP 1865 0.74 0.36 0.66 0.25 2.00 
SMVP 1865 1.15 0.72 0.97 0.16 6.08 
LnSMVP 1865 -0.04 0.59 -0.03 -1.81 1.80 
TSVP 1349 1.08 0.42 1.01 0.23 1.86 
LnTSVP 1349 0.01 0.36 0.01 -1.46 1.58 
DebtR.at 1812 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.00 0.83 
DebtDev 1778 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.47 0.56 
RetVar 1778 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.00003 0.0059 
FCF 1687 -29.43 630.04 3.12 -19374.00 5576.00 
Intangibles 1454 0.07 0.11 0.01 0 0.72 
Div Rat 1723 0.29 1.96 0.20 -38.00 29.50 
ShrBase 1686 13439.22 43113.67 3861.44 86.70 794802.00 
Proceeds 1856 83.97 107.67 49.70 0.40 1567.90 
Age 1856 22.01 19.26 18.00 1.00 74.00 
Tie 1808 26.04 380.76 4.07 -186.97 15608.00 
SPRC 1865 30.34 23.22 25.44 4.25 543.19 
MV 1865 2400.10 7461.19 489.91 6.71 112481.26 
so 1865 55.00 116.90 19.85 0.422 2239.83 
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Panel B: Univariate Statistics for Public Equity (Table II continued) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
SVP 831 0.66 0.33 0.58 0.25 2.00 
MVP 831 0.72 0.35 0.64 0.25 1.97 
SMVP 831 1.09 0.73 0.91 0.18 5.09 
LnSMVP 831 -0.10 0.61 -0.9 -1.70 1.65 
TSVP 503 0.99 0.43 0.91 0.23 3.19 
LnTSVP 503 -0.09 0.41 -0.09 -1.46 1.16 
DebtRat 813 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.83 
DebtDev 801 -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.47 0.44 
RetVar 801 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.00004 0.006 
FCF 769 -25.56 205.88 3.86 -3664.69 433.00 
Intangibles 639 0.07 0.12 0.01 0 0.72 
Div Rat 777 0.19 1.19 0.00 -22.80 20.00 
ShrBase 755 20624.96 59695.37 4903.47 86.70 794802.33 
Proceeds 826 66.32 103.98 37.45 0.40 1567.90 
Age 826 13.74 14.92 9.00 1.00 71.00 
Tie 784 43.43 564.97 4.18 -186.97 15608.00 
SPRC 831 25~91 13.49 23.50 5.13 88.44 
MV 831 770.29 2085.06 239.28 6.71 32342.58 
so 831 23.77 47.51 9.87 0.42 754.35 
Panel C: Univariate Statistic for Public Debt 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
SVP 528 0.74 0.33 0.67 0.27 1.90 
MVP 528 0.74 0.36 0.67 0.25 1.98 
SMVP 528 1.19 0.73 1.04 0.17 6.08 
LnSMVP 528 0.01 0.58 0.04 -1.79 1.81 
TSVP 429 1.13 0.45 1.06 0.37 4.86 
LnTSVP- 429 0.06 0.33 0.06 -1.01 1.58 
DebtRat 508 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.68 
DebtDev 492 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.37 0.36 
RetVar 492 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.00003 0.004 
FCF 462 -37.40 1015.22 0.18 -19374.00 5576.00 
Intangibles 410 0.07 0.11 0.02 0 0.74 
Div Rat 478 0.36 2.40 0.36 -38.00 17.88 
ShrBase 470 7681.38 17717.95 3255.10 186.17 232358.38 
Proceeds 526 140.46 120.33 100.00 1.30 1000.00 
Age 526 32.38 20.50 29.00 1.00 74.00 
Tie 524 8.96 45.49 4.14 -4.24 942.94 
SPRC 528 37.56 30.53 33.08 5.00 543.19 
MV 528 4944.85 10792.42 1833.09 16.14 112481.26 
so 528 105.75 174.39 49.85 0.97 2239.83 
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Panel D: Univariate Statistics for Private Debt (Table II continued) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
SVP 506 0.76 0.32 0.69 0.25 1.93 
MVP 506 0.76 0.36 0.70 0.25 1.99 
SMVP 506 1.20 0.71 1.02 0.16 4.81 
LnSMVP 506 0.02 0.57 0.02 -1.81 1.57 
TSVP 417 1.12 0.37 1.06 0.40 3.08 
LnTSVP 417 0.07 0.30 0.06 -0.92 1.12 
DebtRat 491 0.23 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.83 
DebtDev 485 0.01 0.09 -0.001 -0.42 0.56 
RetVar 485 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.00004 0.005 
FCF 456 -27.87 595.81 2.75 -9571.30 3752.7 
Intangibles 405 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.63 
Div Rat 468 0.39 2.45 0.29 -29.33 29.50 
ShrBase 461 7541.06 22229.91 3350.87 280.40 423899.41 
Proceeds 504 53.94 71.77 30.00 0.70 550.00 
Age 504 24.75 18.23 21.00 1.00 72.00 
Tie 500 16.67 145.30 3.90 -6.01 3187.68 
SPRC 506 30'.08 25.21 24.28 4.25 355.75 
MV 506 2424.33 8101.99 504.34 8.19 90726.28 
so 506 53.31 103.40 21.24 1.06 1261.19 
Panels B, C, and D of Table II present the same statistics for the public equity, 
public debt, and private debt sub-samples, respectively. Of particular interest, is the 
variation in the average and median valuation ratio across the sub-samples. The average 
(median) TSVP for the public equity sample is 0.99 (0.91). While the same ratio for the 
public debt and private debt samples have an average (median) of 1.13 (1.06) and 1.12 
(1.06), respectively. In a univariate setting, it appears that the public equity issuers are 
over-valued at the time of issuance relative to their benchmark and the debt issuers are 
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undervalued. 21 The public equity issuers also appear to be younger firms, have smaller 
market capitalization, smaller dividend payout ratios, smaller shareholder bases, and 
fewer shares outstanding, than either of the debt sub-samples. 
Table III presents further evidence, in a univariate setting, of a difference in 
valuation as a function of the type of issue. Panel A of Table III shows the percent of 
observations greater than and less than 1 for each type of issue. For public equity issues, 
more than 62% of the issues have TSVP ratios less than 1 while only 38% are greater 
than 1. The difference between these is significant at the 1 percent level. While the 
TSVP ratio for all debt issues is greater than 1 in 55.5% of the observations, which is 
significantly different from the 44.5% observations that are less than 1. In Panel B, the 
percent of issues greater than 1.1 and less than 0.9 are examined to better understand the 
distribution of the valuation ratio. The results from Panel A could be driven by a large 
number of ratios just slightly less than or slightly greater than 1. However, when 
boundaries are placed around 1, equally strong evidence of over-valuation for public 
equity issues (64% less than 1) and under-valuation for debt issues (57% greater than 1) 
is found. The Kruskal-Wallis test in panel C examines if the distribution has the same 
location parameter across the different sub-samples. Except for the private versus public 
debt sub-samples the hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level indicating that median 
misvaluation is significantly different for the private debt versus public equity and public 
21 Although, the results for the two benchmarks are presented in the tables, the time-series benchmark is 
discussed throughout this exposition rather than the matching sample benchmark. The results from either 
are qualitatively similar in all cases. However, it is my contention that the time-series benchmark is a 
better, less noisy control. First, because it is the average value of the sample firm itself, computed for the 
two years prior to issue, the result is not a function of the matching algorithm chosen. Second, the 
matching benchmark is valued contemporaneously with the date of the issuing firms valuation ratio. 
Should there be an industry-wide or market-wide mis-valuation of equity, the matching firm will be subject 
to the same mis-valuation as the sample firm, and will be ineffective as a control. 
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debt versus public equity. The univariate tests reveal an apparent pattern of over-
valuation for public equity issuers and under-valuation for debt issuers. 
The following logistic regression equation tests how well the misvaluation 
measure predicts the likelihood that the firm will issue a particular type of security, in a 
multivariate setting. Table IV presents the coefficient estimates from the following logit 
regression model: 
Issue Typej = cJ>(f3o + {3 1LnTSVPj + (3 2LnCapj + (3 3LnProcj + (3 d,nAgej) (5) 
where Issue Typej,T is the probability that issuer j issues one type of security or another -
eg. Issue Typej,T takes on the value of 1 if the issue is debt and O if the issue is equity, cJ> 
is the logistic cumulative density function, LnTSVPj is the natural log of the mis-
valuation measure. The balance of the variables is intended to control for the differing 
size of firms, size of the issue, and the age of the issuer. LnCapj is the natural log of the 
market capitalization of the issuer for the year ending prior to issue, LnProcj is the natural 
log of the proceeds raised in the issue, LnAgej is the natural log the issuers age, and the 
{3's are the parameters of the logit model. 
Model I in Table IV-A explores the choice between debt and equity. The 
regression has a likelihood ratio of 275.75 and a R-squared of 0.18. The coefficient for 
LnTSVPj is positive (1.2455) and significant at the one-percent level, i.e., firms that are 
more under-valued, are more likely to issue debt. Two of the control variables are also 
significant. Older firms and firms raising large amounts of capital are more likely to use 
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Table III 
Percentage of Misvaluation and Sample Comparison 
The percentage misvaluation is based on TSVP or SMVP. TSVP is computed as SVP divided by AVG12rly. SVP is defined 
as the intrinsic value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the 
intrinsic value. SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. 
A VG 12rly is the average of the SVP ratios in relative year -1 and -2. Panel C reports the difference in magnitude of 
misvaluation of issuing firms relative to each other. SMVP is calculated as SVP divided by MVP. SVP is defined as the 
intrinsic value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic 
value. MVP is the variable for the matching firms and is defined as above. The Kruskal-W allis test, a simple linear rank 
statistic, is used to test the difference between the three samples, private debt, public debt and public equity. 
Panel A: Percentage of Issuing Firms with TSVP > 1 and:,:; 1 
Percentage of Public Equity Total Debt Total Public Private Debt Public Debt 
firms with: Offerings Offerings Offerings Placements Placements 
TSVP :s; 1 62.43% 44.56% 54.18% 44.60% 44.52% 
TSVP > 1 37.57% 55.44% 45.82% 55.40% 55.48% 
Z - Statistic -5.5735*** 3.1630*** -2.5550*** 2.2037** 2.2692*** 
N 503 846 932 417 429 
Percentage of Issuing Firms with SMVP > 1 and :s; 1 
SMVP :s; 1 57.52% 47.87% 52.65% 51.58% 52.65 
SMVP> 1 42.48% 52.13% 47.35% 48.42% 47.35 
Z - Statistic -4.3362*** 1.3683* -2.6312*** 0.7113 1.2185 
N 831 1034 1359 506 528 
Panel B: Percentage of Issuing Firms with TSVP > 1.1 and< 0.9 
Percentage of Public Equity Total Debt Total Public Private Debt Public Debt 
firms with: Offerings Offerings Offerings Placements Placements 
TSVP<0.9 63.64% 43.34% 54.91% 43.04 43.65% 
TSVP > 1.1 36.36% 56.66% 45.09% 56.96 56.35% 
Z - Statistic -5.4272*** 3.3253*** -2.6024*** 2.4752** 2.2258*** 
N 396 623 703 316 307 
w 
0 
------ ---------~----- - -------- -------~--~-------- --------~---
Percentage oflssuing Firms with SMVP > 1.1 and< 0.9 (Table II continued) 
SMVP<0.9 
SMVP > 1.1 
Z - Statistic 
N 












Panel C: Kruskal-Wallis Test 
TSVP 
Chi-Square 
Public Debt vs. Public Equity Private Debt vs. Public Equity 
SMVP 
Chi-Square 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 

















Binary Logistic Regressions with Time Series Benchmark 
Table IV-A provides the estimates from logistic regressions predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported 
with P-values in parenthesis. LnTSVP is computed as the logged SVP divided by A VG 12rly. SVP is defined as the intrinsic 
value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. PRC 
is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. A VG 12rly is the 
average of the SVP ratios in relative year -1 and -2. LnAge is the log of the number of years the issuing firm exists. SVP is 
defined as the intrinsic value of the share price divided by PRC using 3-year residual income model (RIM). LnProc is the log 
of the total proceeds of the issue ($million). LnCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as SPRC times 
SO, the number of shares outstanding obtain from CRSP. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (E-values are in Earentheses) 
MODEL 1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Debt (=1) VS. Public Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt(=l) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. 
Independent Variable Equity (=O) Public Eguity (=O) Public Equity(=O) Public Debt (=O) 
Intercept -3.1566*** -6.6838*** -1.8436*** 5.6104*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnTSVP 1.2455*** 0.9752*** 1.3618*** 0.1280 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.59) 
LnCap 0.0311 0.357 0.0338 0.0027 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.92) 
LnProc 0.2337*** 0.7547*** -0.1994*** -1.0098*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnAge 0.8695*** 1.0458*** 0.7226*** -0.5072*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-
Square 275.75*** 369.78*** 141.91 *** 259.59*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
R~square 0.18 0.32 0.14 0.25 
N 1402 971 946 887 
w 
N 
--~- -------- -.------- ------
Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table IV-A continued) 
Debt vs. Equity 
Input Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits 
95% 
LnTSVP 3.475 2.499 4.830 
LnCap 1.032 0.990 1.075 
LnProc 1.263 1.140 1.400 
LnAge 2.386 2.054 2.771 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
Public Debt vs. Public 
Equity 
Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits 
95% 
2.652 1.734 4.055 
1.036 0.985 1.091 
2.127 1.830 2.473 
2.846 2.331 3.474 
Private Debt vs. Public Private Debt vs. Public 
Eguity Debt 
Odds Confidence Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits 
95% 95% 
3.903 2.681 5.683 1.137 0.715 1.807 
1.034 0.986 1.085 1.003 0.953 1.055 
0.819 0.723 0.928 0.364 0.311 0.427 





Binary Logistic Regressions with Matching Sample Benchmark 
Table IV-B provides the estimates from logistic regressions predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported 
with P-values in parenthesis. LSMVP3 is computed as the logged SVP3 divided by MVP3. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic 
value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. 
SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. MVP3 is the 
variable for the matching firms and is defined as above. LnCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as 
SPRC times SPSO, the number of shares outstanding obtain from CRSP. LnProc is the log of the total proceeds of the issue 
($million). LnAge is the log of the number of years the issuing firm exists. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) 
MODEL 1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Debt (=1) vs. Public Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt(=l) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. 
Independent Variable Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) Public Equity(=O) Public Debt ( =O) 
Intercept -2.9585*** -6.4137*** -1.8484*** 4.8843*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnSMVP 0.2242*** 0.2187** 0.2557*** 0.1140 
(<0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.37) 
LnCap 0.0438** 0.0483** 0.0467** -0.0066 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.78) 
LnProc 0.2512*** 0.8276*** -0.1889*** -1.0530*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnAge 0.6996*** 0.7946*** 0.6367*** -0.2046*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-
Square 363.77*** 486.63*** 181.19*** 289.51 *** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
R-square 0.18 0.30 0.13 0.25 
N 1856 1352 1330 1030 
----~- ~------
--- -- ----- ---- --~--~---- ---
Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table IV-B continued) 
Debt vs. Equity 
Input Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits 
95% 
LnSMVP 1.251 1.054 1.486 
LnCap 1.045 1.009 1.082 
LnProc 1.286 1.177 1.404 
LnAge 2.013 1.839 2.204 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
Public Debt vs. Public 
Equity 
Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits 
95% 
1.244 0.996 1.555 
1.049 1.004 1.097 
2.288 2.001 2.616 
2.214 1.959 2.501 
Private Debt vs. Public Private Debt vs. Public 
Equity Debt 
Odds Confidence Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits 
95% 95% 
1.291 1.054 1.582 1.121 0.874 1.438 
1.045 1.001 1.090 0.993 0.947 1.042 
0.828 0.743 0.922 0.349 0.300 0.406 
1.890 1.689 2.116 0.815 0.709 0.936 
The results are similar for Model 2, where Issue Typej equals 1 if the issue is 
public debt and O if the issue is public equity. Issue Typej equals 1 if the issue is private 
debt and O if the issue is public equity in Model 3. Again, the results are similar to 
Models 1 and 2, except for the LnProcj control variable. In Model 3 firms raising larger 
amounts of capital are more likely to use equity rather than private debt. 
Model 4 models the choice between private debt and public debt. Older firms and 
firms raising larger amounts of capital are more likely to issue public debt. However, 
there is no significance found on the misvaluation measure. Table V-A explores the 
security decision choice using a multinomial regression. The results are consistent with 
the binary regressions. 
In summary, the primary findings of the logistic regressions show that the more 
over-valued a firm, the more likely it will chose to issue equity, ceteris paribus. This 
result is robust to separating the debt issues into only public debt and only private debt. 
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Multinomial Logistic Regressions with Time Series Benchmark 
Table V-A provides the estimates from a logistic regression predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported with 
P-values in parenthesis. LSTVP3 is computed as the logged SVP3 divided by A VG 12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic 
value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. 
SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. A VG 12rly is the 
average of the SVP3 ratios in relative year 1- and-2. Debtrat is long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6). 
LnCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as SPRC times SPSO, the number of shares outstanding obtain 
from CRSP. LnProc is the log of the total proceeds of the issue ($million). LnAge is the log of the number of years the 
issuing firm exists. Issue type is the type of security issued, where 1 represents private debt, 3 represents public debt, and 4 
represents public equity. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) 
Issue Type 
Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt ( 1) vs. 
Public Equity ( 4) Public Eguity (42 Public Debt (3) 
Intercept -1.8593*** -6.9420*** 5.0837*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnTSVP 1.3162*** 1.1209*** 0.1953 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.36) 
LnCap 0.0317 0.0301 0.0015 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.95) 
LnProc -0.1540*** 0.8332*** -0.9871 *** 
(0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnAge 0.6741 *** 1.0345*** -0.3604*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 





Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table V-A continued) 
Issue type 1 vs. 4 Issue type 3 vs. 4 Issue type 1 vs. 3 
Input Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval 
Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% 
LSTVP 3.729 2.564 5.424 3.068 2.008 4.686 1.216 0.798 1.852 
LnCap 1.032 0.984 1.082 1.031 0.981 1.083 1.002 0.953 1.053 
LnProc 0.857 0.758 0.969 2.301 1.980 2.674 0.373 0.320 0.434 




Multinomial Logistic Regressions with Matching Firm Benchmark 
Table V-B provides the estimates from a logistic regression predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported with 
P-values in parenthesis. LSMVP3 is computed as the logged SVP3 divided by MVP3. SVP3 is defmed as the intrinsic value 
of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. SPRC is the 
prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. MVP3 is the variable for the 
matching firms and is defined as above. LnCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as SPRC times SPSO, 
the number of shares outstanding obtain from CRSP. LnProc is the log of the total proceeds of the issue ($millions). LnAge is 
the log of the number of years the issuing firm exists. Issue type is the type of security issued, where 1 represents private debt, 
3 represents public debt, and 4 represents public equity. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) 
Issue Type Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt (1) vs. 
Public Equity ( 4) Public E9.uity ( 4) Public Debt (3) 
Intercept -1.8300*** -6.5201 *** 4.6901 *** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnSMVP 0.2631 *** 0.1806* 0.0825 
(<0.01) (0.10) (0.49) 
LnCap 0.0440** 0.0456** -0.0016 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.95) 
LnProc -0.1688*** 0.8551 *** -1.0239*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnAge 0.5997*** 0.8001 *** -0.2004*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 




---- --~-~ -- --- ---- ------------- -----~--
Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table V-B continued) 
Issue type 1 vs. 4 Issue type 3 vs. 4 Issue type 1 vs. 3 
Input Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval 
Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% 
LS MVP 1.301 1.065 1.589 1.198 0.965 1.488 1.086 0.860 1.371 
LnCap 1.045 1.002 1.090 1.047 1.003 1.092 0.998 0.954 1.045 
LnProc 0.845 0.760 0.939 2.352 2.066 2.677 0.359 0.313 0.412 
LnAge 1.822 1.637 2.027 2.226 1.974 2.510 0.818 0.715 0.936 
2. Inclusion of the Pecking Order and Tradeoff Variables 
Table VI-A incorporates the variables from Table IV-A and adds additional 
variables to control for the static trade-off and pecking order theories. The following 
logistic regression equation is estimated: 
Issue Typej = c:J>(f3o + /31LnTSVPj + /3 2DebtDumj + /3 3LnRetVarj + /3 ,iFCF'j + {3 5Intangj 
+ {3J)ivRatj + /3 7LnShrBasej + {3 sLnTIEj + {3 <)LnCapj + /310LnProcj + /311LnAgej) (6) 
where Issue Typej,T is the probability that issuer j issues one type of security or another -
e.g., Issue Typej,T takes on the value of 1 if the issue is debt and O if the issue is equity, c:J> 
is the logistic cumulative density function, LnTSVPj is the natural log of the misvaluation 
measure, DebtDumj is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company's current debt ratio 
is below the average 10 year debt ratio and O otherwise, LnRetVarj is the natural log of 
the variance of daily returns for the year prior to the issue, FCF'j is the free cash flow in 
$millions, Intangj is the intangibles as a percent of total assets, DivRatj is the dividend 
payout rate, LnShrBasej is the natural log of the number of shares outstanding divided by 
the number of shareholders, and LnTIEj is the natural log of the times interest earned 
ratio. The balance of the variables are the same control variables as used in Equation (5). 
In Model 1 the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the issue is debt and O if it is 
equity. LnTSVPj is positive (1.5029) and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating 
that firms are more likely to issue equity if they are over-valued. Similar to the previous 
models, LnProcj and LnAgej are both positive and significant at the one-percent level. I 
also find that LnRetVarj is negative and significant at the one-percent level. There are 
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several possible interpretations for the volatility of returns. Higher risk firms are likely to 
have higher costs of debt and therefore are more likely to issue equity instead of debt. 
However, the debt capacity of the firm is controlled for by the times interest earned 
variable (LnTIE), the debt ratio dummy (DebtDUM) and the free cash flow measure 
(FCF). An alternative interpretation is that the LnRetV ar is measuring asymmetric 
information and firms with lower asymmetric information issue debt. This however is 
inconsistent with the pecking order off theory. 
The dependent variable in Model 2 equals 1 if the issue is public debt and is O if 
public equity. In this model, again LnTSVPj is positive and significant (at the one-percent 
level), as are LnProci and LnAgej., and LnRetVarj is negative and significant. In addition, 
DebtDumj and FCF'j are positive and significant. The debtdum variable provides some 
evidence that in the choice between public debt and equity, the deviation from the 
historic debt level of the firm is a significant factor. Specifically, the further below its 
historic debt level, the more likely the firm is to issue public debt. The positive FCF 
indicates that higher cash flows increase the likelihood of issuing debt, possibly because 
the firm is better able to service the debt and therefore the cost of debt is lower than the 
cost of equity. Therefore, in summary, model 2 provides evidence of all three theories. 
The market timing theory is evidenced by the positive coefficient on the valuation ratio. 
The static tradeofftheory is evidenced by the positive coefficient on debtdum, and the 
pecking order theory is evidenced by the retvar and FCF variables, which are consistent 
with greater debt capacity reducing the cost of debt relative to other forms of financing. 
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Table VI-A 
'Horse Race' Binary Logistic Regressions with Time Series Benchmark 
Table VI-A provides the estimates from logistic regressions predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported 
with P-values in parenthesis. LnTSVP is computed as the logged SVP divided by AVG12rly. SVP is defined as the 
intrinsic value of the share price divided by PRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic 
value. PRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. A VG 12rly 
is the average of the SVP ratios in relative year -1 and -2. LnCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as 
PRC times SO, the number of shares outstanding obtain from CRSP. DebtDum is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
of one if the company's current debtratio is below its estimated target. It is computed as the deviation between the 
company's current debt ratio (long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6)) prior to the file or issue date and its 
target debt ratio ( estimated by computing the average debt ratio over the previous 10 years prior to the file or issue date). 
LnRetVar is the log of average daily variance of the stock over the year prior to the file or issue date. FCF is free cash flow 
computed as income before extra ordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus cash dividends minus additions to 
fixed assets ( d123+d125-dl27-d128). Intangibles are obtained from COMPUSTAT and are scaled by total assets (D33/D6). 
DivRat is the payout dividend ratio (d26/d58). LnShrBase is the log of the shareholder base computed as the number of 
shares outstanding divided by the number of shareholders (d25*1000/d100) (thousands). LnTIE is the log of times interest 
earned. LnProc is the log of the total proceeds of the issue ($million). LnAge is the log of the number of years the issuing 
firm exists. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (2-values are in 2arentheses) 
MODEL 1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Independent Debt (=1) vs. Public Debt (=l) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt (=l) vs. 
Variable Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) Public Eguity (=O) Public Debt (=O) 
Intercept -5.4715*** -8.2914*** -4.2212*** 8.5234*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnTSVP 1.5029*** 1.2390*** 1.6681 *** 0.1159 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.70) 
DebtDum 0.1923 0.4901 ** 0.0937 -0.2528 
(0.21) (0.02) (0.60) (0.19) 
LnRetVar -0.2989*** -0.3413** -0.2030 0.3697*** 
(<0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.01) 
FCF 0.0001 0.0011 *** -2.32E-6 -0.0002 
(0.34) (<0.01) (0.99) (0.28) 
Intangibles 0.3126 -0.594 0.3404 0.2948 















Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) (Table VI-A Continued) 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Debt (=1) vs. Public Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. 
Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) 
0.0244 0.0114 0.0571 
(0.49) (0.80) (0.28) 
0.0782 -0.0528 0.1677* 
(0.34) (0.61) (0.08) 
0.0569 0.0265 0.0779 
(0.43) (0.78) (0.33) 
0.0152 0.0088 0.0180 
(0.55) (0.78) (0.55) 
0.2043*** 0.8397*** -0.3042*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
0.6692*** 0.7221 *** 0.6459*** 














Private Debt (=1) vs. 

















----- ---- ---------- ---
Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table VI-A Continued) 
Public Debt vs. Public Private Debt vs. Public Private Debt vs. Public 
Debt vs. Equity Equity Equity Debt 
Input Odds Confidence Odds Confidence Odds Confidence Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits 
95% 95% 95% 95% 
LnTSVP 4.495 2.907 6.950 3.452 1.988 5.995 5.302 3.196 8.797 1.123 0.622 2.026 
LnCap 1.015 0.966 1.067 0.009 0.949 1.072 1.018 0.960 1.079 0.996 0.936 1.059 
DebtDum 1.212 0.896 1.640 1.632 1.093 2.438 1.098 0.777 1.553 0.777 0.532 1.133 
LnRetVar 0.742 0.592 0.928 0.711 0.525 0.962 0.816 0.637 1.047 1.447 1.079 1.941 
FCF 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Intangibles 1.367 0.250 7.478 0.552 0.069 4.417 1.405 0.189 10.476 1.343 0.169 10.685 
Div Rat 1.025 0.956 1.098 1.011 0.925 1.106 1.059 0.954 1.175 1.028 0.941 1.123 
LnShrBase 1.081 0.922 1.268 0.949 0.775 1.161 1.183 0.979 1.429 1.022 0.832 1.256 
LnTIE 1.059 0.921 1.217 1.027 0.855 1.234 1.081 0.925 1.263 1.035 0.862 1.243 
.js. LnProc 1.227 1.071 1.405 2.316 1.877 2.857 0.738 0.621 0.876 0.331 0.270 0.407 
.js. LnAge 1.953 1.552 2.456 2.059 1.517 2.795 1.908 1.445 2.518 0.688 0.511 0.926 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 




"Horse Race' Binary Logistic Regressions with Sample Firm Benchmark 
Table VI-B provides the estimates from logistic regressions predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported 
with P-values in parenthesis. LSMVP3 is computed as the logged SVP3 divided by MVP3. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic 
value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. 
SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. MVP3 is the 
variable for the matching firms and is defined as above. LSCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as 
SPRC times SPSO, the number of shares outstanding obtain from CRSP ($million). Debtdum is a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of one if the company's current debtratio is below its estimated target. It is computed as the deviation 
between the company's current debt ratio (long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6)) prior to the file/issue date 
and its target debt ratio ( estimated by computing the average debt ratio over the previous 10 years prior to the file/issue 
date). Lretvar is the log of average daily variance of the stock over the year prior to the file or issue date. FCF is free cash 
flow computed as income before extra ordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus cash dividends minus 
additions to fixed assets (d123+dl25-dl27-dl28) ($millions). Intangibles are obtained from COMPUSTAT and are scaled 
by total assets (D33/D6). Divrat is the payout dividend ratio ( d26/d58). Lshrbase is the log of the shareholder base 
computed as the number of shares outstanding divided by the number of shareholders (d25*1000/d100) (thousands). Ltie is 
the log of times interest earned. Lproc is the log of the total proceeds of the issue ($million). LAge is the log of the number 
of years the issuing firm exists. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (:e-values are in earentheses} 
MODEL 1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Independent Debt (=1) vs. Public Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. 
Variable Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) Public Debt (=O) 
Intercept -7.0560*** -9.2755*** -6.0540*** 7.9212*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnSMVP 0.2426*** 0.1606 0.3460*** 0.2724* 
(0.04) (0.31) (0.01) (0.10) 
DebtDum 0.0332 0.244 0.0330 -0.009 
(0.16) (0.41) (0.23) (0.77) 
LnRetVar 0.0681 0.2811 0.0197 -0.1952 
(0.63) (0.14) (0.90) (0.29) 
FCF -0.4486*** -0.4413*** -0.3436*** 0.3665*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Intangibles 0.0001 0.0001 ** -0.00004 -0.0002 
_____ ,----------- ---------- ---------- -- ----------- ------ ----- --- ----
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in :earentheses) (Table VI-B Continued} 
MODEL 1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
Independent Debt (=1) vs. Public Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. Private Debt (=1) vs. 
Variable Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) Public Equity (=O) Public Debt (=O) 
(0.58) (0.03) (0.79) (0.26) 
Div Rat 0.7508 -0.2128 1.0480 0.2763 
(0.32) (0.82) (0.24) (0.78) 
LnShrBase 0.0177 0.009 0.0355 0.062 
(0.57) (0.84) (0.39) (0.87) 
LnTIE 0.0878 -0.0900 0.2185*** 0.0920 
(0.22) (0.34) (0.01) (0.35) 
LnCap 0.0195 0.0517 0.0086 0.0277 
(0.76) (0.55) (0.90) (0.76) 
LnProc 0.2534*** 0.9270*** -0.2534*** -1.1604*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Lnage 0.6582*** 0.7090*** 0.6434*** -0.2894** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.03) 
.I:,. Likelihood 
°' Ratio Chi-
Square 164.93*** 273.99*** 72.08*** 224.58*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
R-square 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.28 
N 1086 750 732 690 
---- ----
Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table VI-B Continued) 
Public Debt vs. Public Private Debt vs: Public Private Debt vs. Public 
Debt vs. Eguity E9.uity Equity Debt 
Input Odds Confidence Odds Confidence Odds Confidence Odds Confidence 
Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits Ratio Interval limits 
95% 95% 95% 95% 
LnSMVP 1.275 1.010 1.608 1.174 0.864 1.596 1.413 1.079 1.852 1.313 0.954 1.808 
LnCap 1.034 0.987 1.083 1.025 0.967 1.085 1.034 0.979 1.091 0.991 0.934 1.051 
DebtDum 1.071 0.812 1.411 1.325 0.911 1.926 1.020 0.745 1.396 0.823 0.571 1.185 
LnRetVar 0.639 0.527 0.774 0.643 0.492 0.840 0.709 0.573 0.878 1.443 1.104 1.886 
FCF 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Intangibles 2.119 0.477 9.409 0.808 0.124 5.256 2.852 0.496 16.387 1.318 0.193 8.988 
Div Rat 1.018 0.958 1.082 1.009 0.925 1.101 1.036 0.956 1.123 1.006 0.936 1.082 
LnShrBase 1.092 0.949 1.256 0.914 0.759 1.100 1.244 1.052 1.471 1.096 0.904 1.329 
LnTIE 1.020 0.901 1.155 1.053 0.890 1.246 1.009 0.878 1.158 1.028 0.863 1.224 
LnProc 1.288 1.138 1.459 2.527 2.074 3.078 0.776 0.663 0.909 0.313 0.256 0.834 
LnAge 1.931 1.597 2.336 2.032 1.577 2.618 1.903 1.504 2.408 0.749 0.575 0.975 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
Model 3 differentiates between the choice of private debt and public equity. The 
mis-valuation measure is positive and significant at the one-percent level. Again 
indicating that over-valued firms will issue equity rather than private debt. Both LnProcj 
and LnAgej are significant at the one-percent level however, the sign on proceeds has 
changed. Firms issuing private debt are more likely to have smaller issues than firms 
issuing public equity. LnShrBasej is positive and significant at the ten-percent level 
indicating that firms with a smaller sharehdlder base are more likely to issue private debt. 
The dependent variable of Model 4 equals 1 when the firm issues private debt and 
0 if the issue is public debt. LnTSVPj is positive, however, insignificant. In this case 
equity valuation has no significant relation with the choice of public or private debt. The 
control variable for both proceeds and age is significant, while proceeds has again a 
negative sign. LnRetVarj is also positive and significant, at the one-percent level. This is 
consistent with low risk, older firms, seeking larger amounts of capital issue public debt. 




'Horse Race' Multinomial Logistic Regressions with Time Series Benchmark 
Table VII-A provides the estimates from logistic regressions predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported 
with P-values in parenthesis. LSTVP3 is computed as the logged SVP3 divided by A VG 12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic 
value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. SPRC 
is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. A VG 12rly is the average 
of the SVP3 ratios in relative year -1 and -2. LnCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as SPRC times 
SPSO, the number of shares outstanding obtain from CRSP ($million). Debtdum is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 
one if the company's current debtratio is below its estimated target. It is computed as the deviation between the company's 
current debt ratio (long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6)) prior to the file/issue date and its target debt ratio 
( estimated by computing the average debt ratio over the previous 10 years prior to the file/issue date). LnRetvar is the log of 
average daily variance of the stock over the year prior to the file/issue date. FCF is free cash flow computed as income before 
extra ordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus cash dividends minus additions to fixed assets ( dl 23+dl 25-
d127-dl 28) ($million). Intangibles are obtained from COMPUSTAT and are scaled by total assets (D33/D6). Divrat is the 
payout dividend ratio ( d26/d58). LnShrbase is the log of the shareholder base computed as the number of shares outstanding 
divided by the number of shareholders ( d25* 1000/dlOO) (thousands). LnTie is the log of times interest earned. LnProc is the 
log of the total proceeds of the issue ($million). LnAge is the log of the number of years the issuing firm exists. Issue type is 
the type of security issued, where 1 represents private debt, 3 represents public debt, and 4 represents public equity. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) 
Issue Type Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt (1) vs. 
Public Equity (4) Public Eguity (4) Public Debt (3) 
Intercept -3.8061 *** -9.6755*** 5.8694*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnTSVP 1.6037*** 1.3466*** 0.2572 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.34) 
LnCap 0.0139 0.0185 -0.0046 
(0.63) (0.54) (0.88) 
Debtdum 0.0828 0.3803** -0.2975 
(0.63) (0.04) (0.11) 
LnRetvar -0.2012 -0.4045*** 0.2033 
(0.12) (<0.01) (0.15) 
FCF 0.00001 0.0003* -0.0003* 
---- ----- --------------
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) (Table VII-A Continued) 
Issue Type Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt (1) vs. 
Public Equi~ {4) Public Equity (4) Public Debt (3) 
(0.94) (0.10) (0.10) 
Intangibles 0.4182 -0.0979 0.5161 
(0.68) (0.92) (0.60) 
Divrat 0.0495 0.0061 0.0434 
(0.29) (0.89) (0.32) 
LnShrbase 0.1277 0.0058 0.1220 
(0.17) (0.95) (0.21) 
LnTie 0.0765 0.0594 0.0170 
Vl (0.34) (0.49) (0.84) 
0 LnProc -0.2428*** 0.8625*** -1.1053*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnAge 0.5646*** 0.7763*** -0.2117*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 





Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table VII-A Continued) 
Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt ( 1) vs. 
Public Equity (4) Public Equity (4) Public Debt {3) 
Input Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval 
Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% 
LnTSVP 4.972 3.043 8.121 3.844 2.241 6.595 1.293 0.760 2.200 
LnCap 1.014 0.958 1.074 1.019 0.960 1.080 0.995 0.939 1.055 
DebtDum 1.086 0.774 1.525 1.463 1.010 2.119 0.743 0.516 1.068 
LnRetVar 0.818 0.636 1.051 0.667 0.505 0.882 1.225 0.931 1.631 
FCF 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.000 0.999 1.000 
Intangibles 1.519 0.215 10.736 0.907 0.125 6.564 1.675 0.239 11.768 
Div Rat 1.051 0.960 1.151 1.006 0.922 1.098 1.044 0.959 1.137 
LnShrBase 1.136 0.948 1.361 1.006 0.828 1.221 1.130 0.931 1.371 
LnTIE 1.079 0.922 1.263 1.061 0.895 1.258 1.017 0.860 1.204 
Vl 
LnProc 0.784 0.667 0.923 2.369 1.949 2.880 0.331 0.272 0.403 -
LnAge 1.759 1.356 2.281 2.173 1.631 2.897 0.809 0.604 1.083 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 





'Horse Race' Multinomial Logistic Regressions with Matching Firm Benchmark 
Table VII-B provides the estimates from logistic regressions predicting type of security to issue. Coefficients are reported 
with P-values in parenthesis. LSMVP3 is computed as the logged SVP3 divided by MVP3. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic 
value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. SPRC 
is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file/issue date. MVP3 is the variable for 
the matching firms and is defined as above. LnCap is the log of market capitalization of equity calculated as SPRC times 
SPSO, the number of shares outstanding obtain from CRSP ($million). Debtdum is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 
one if the company's current debtratio is below its estimated target. It is computed as the deviation between the company's 
current debt ratio (long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6)) prior to the file/issue date and its target debt ratio 
( estimated by computing the average debt ratio over the previous 10 years prior to the file/issue date). LnRetvar is the log of 
average daily variance of the stock over the year prior to the file/issue date. FCF is free cash flow computed as income before 
extra ordinary items plus depreciation and ammtization minus cash dividends minus additions to fixed assets (d123+dl25-
dl27-d128) ($million). Intangibles are obtained from COMPUSTAT and are scaled by total assets (D33/D6). Divrat is the 
payout dividend ratio (d26/d58). LnShrbase is the log of the shareholder base computed as the number of shares outstanding 
divided by the number of shareholders (d25*1000/dl00) (thousands). LnTie is the log of times interest earned. LnProc is the 
log of the total proceeds of the issue ($million). LnAge is the log of the number of years the issuing firm exists. Issue type is 
the type of security issued, where 1 represents private debt, 3 represents public debt, and 4 represents public equity. 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) 
Issue Type Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt (1) vs. 
Public Equity (4) Public Eguity (4) Public Debt (3) 
Intercept -5.08862*** -10.67*** 4.7860*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
LnSMVP 0.3333*** 0.1191 0.2142 
(0.01) (0.42) (0.17) 
LnCap 0.0337 0.0353 -0.0016 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.96) 
Debtdum -0.0023 0.2192 -0.2215 
(0.99) (0.22) (0.21) 
LnRetvar -0.3744*** -0.5193*** 0.1449 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.25) 
FCF -0.00004 0.0003 -0.0003* 
------ - ----------~---~--------~---~-------------~~----------------------- -----~- -----
Panel A: Regression Coefficients (p-values are in parentheses) (Table VII-B Continued) 
Issue Type Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt (1) vs. 
Public Equity (4) Public Eguity (4) Public Debt {3) 
(0.80) (0.18) (0.10) 
Intangibles 0.9097 0.9097 0.6411 
(0.30) (0.77) (0.49) 
Divrat 0.0313 0.0055 0.0258 
(0.43) (0.88) (0.51) 
LnShrbase 0.1713** -0.0330 0.2042** 
(0.04) (0.72) (0.03) 
LnTie 0.0134 0.0445 -0.0311 
(0.85) (0.58) (0.71) 
LnProc -0.2018*** 0.9513*** -1.1531 *** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Vi LnAge 0.5763*** 0.7423*** -0.1660 w 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.21) 





Panel B: Odds Ratio Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Table VII-B Continued} 
Private Debt (1) vs. Public Debt (3) vs. Private Debt (1) vs. 
Public Equity {4} Public Equity ( 4) Public Debt (3) 
Input Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval Odds Confidence Interval 
Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% Ratio limits 95% 
LnSMVP 1.396 1.069 1.822 1.126 0.841 1.509 1.239 0.916 1.676 
LnCap 1.034 0.981 1.091 1.036 0.980 1.095 0.998 0.944 1.056 
DebtDum 0.998 0.731 1.361 1.245 0.880 1.762 0.801 0.565 1.136 
LnRetVar 0.688 0.555 0.853 0.595 0.465 0.762 1.156 0.901 1.483 
FCF 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.000 0.999 1.000 
Intangibles 2.484 0.450 13.712 1.308 0.220 7.787 1.898 0.313 11.505 
Div Rat 1.032 0.955 1.115 1.006 0.934 1.082 1.026 0.950 1.108 
LnShrBase 1.187 1.011 1.394 0.968 0.811 1.155 1.227 1.022 1.472 
LnTIE 1.014 0.879 1.168 1.046 0.895 1.221 0.969 0.825 1.139 
V\ LnProc 0.817 0.704 0.949 2.589 2.151 3.116 0.316 0.261 0.382 
+'- LnAge 1.779 1.429 2.216 2.101 1.648 2.678 0.847 0.655 1.096 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
3. The Frank and Goyal Model Revisited 
To examine the evidence against the pecking order theory provided by Frank and 
Goyal (2003) their model is extended by interacting the financing deficit variable with 
the valuation measure from the residual income model. However, as mentioned before, 
market-to-book value is also often used as a measure of firm valuation. Therefore, it is of 
interest to see what the correlation is between market-to-book ratios and LTSVP3. Table 
VIII shows the correlation between market-to-book value, the changes in market-to-book 
value and the valuation measures. The correlation between market-to-book value and the 
various valuation measures is negative. More specifically, the correlation between the 
time series valuation ratio LTSVP3 and the market-to-book ratio is -0.13. Consistent 
with the findings of Lee et al. (1999), this seems to suggest that the market-to-book ratio 
is not a very robust measure for firm value and that measures based upon earnings and 





Correlation Between Market-to-Book and Valuation Ratios 
The sample includes all issuers of private debt, public debt and public equity during the period from 1980 to 1998 
that meet the parameters discussed in the Data section of the paper. MTB _ 0 value is the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity at year t, at the file/issue year. MTB value is the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity at year t-1. I!,. Market-to-Book is the difference between MTB _ 0 minus 
MTB _ 1. Valuation Ratio is the value, as computed by the Residual Income Model, of equity divided by share 
price. Time-series Valuation Ratio is the Valuation Ratio, scaled by the average of the valuation ratio for the two 
years prior to the issue. Matched Sample Valuation Ratio is the Valuation Ratio scaled by the valuation ratio for 
an industry and size matched firm that did not issue. 
MTB 1 MTB 0 I!,. Market-to- Valuation Time-series Matched 
Book Ratio Valuation Sample 
Ratio Valuation 
Ratio 
Market-to-Book 1 1.00 
Market-to-Book 0 0.42 1.00 
(<0.01) 
I!,. Market-to-book 0.07 0.93 1.00 
(0.01) (<0.01) 
Valuation Ratio -0.28 -0.17 -0.08 1.00 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Time-series Valuation -0.27 -0.13 -0.14 0.44 1.00 
Ratio (0.33) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Matched Sample Valuation -0.15 -0.07 -0.02 0.59 0.23 1.00 
Ratio (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.38) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Table IX includes the measure of misvaluation in the Frank and Goyal model. 
The following regression model is estimated: 
NetDebt1 = Po + P, (DEF;* USTVP;) + p2 (DEF;* OSTVP;) + fi/'!..I; + fi4!lMTB1 
+ fi/'l ln Si + P/1P; + si (7) 
where NetDebti is the net amount of debt issued (COMPUSTAT variables Dl 1 l-Dl 14), 
DEFi is the firm's financing deficit computed as dividend plus net investment plus the 
change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes22, I).. Ti is the change in 
tangible assets divided by total assets, f)..MTB is the change in market-to-book value 
defined as the ratio of market value of assets over book value of assets, f)..lnSi is the 
change in the natural log of net sales, and Af>i is the change in profitability defined as · 
operating income over total assets. Financing deficit is interacted with the amount of 
misvaluation of the firm's equity at the file/issue date. USTVPi takes on the value of one 
when the firm is undervalued relative to its benchmark, and zero otherwise, while 
OSTVPi takes on the value of one when the firm is overvalued relative to its benchmark, 
and zero otherwise. In addition, a similar regression based on misvaluation quartiles is 
estimated. The interaction variables based on the quartiles are defined similarly. Again, 
the regression models are estimated with both benchmarks, the two-year average TSVP 
prior to the sample firm's issue year and the matching firm benchmark. 
In Model 1, the NetDebt variable is regressed on the conventional leverage 
variables and financing deficit. Unlike the Frank and Goyal sample, this sample consists 
of only those firms that issue either equity (44% of the sample) or debt. Therefore, it is 




Pecking Order Regression Analysis 
The sample includes all issuers of private debt, public debt and public equity during the period from 1980 to 
1998 that meet the parameters discussed in the Data section of the paper. The dependent variable in all the 
following regressions is the net amount of debt issued (NETDEBT) (Compustat variables DI 11-Dl 14). In 
Model 1 NETDEBT is regressed on the financing deficit ( defined as in Frank and Goyal, 2003), the change 
in tangible assets (scaled by total assets), the change in market-to-book defined as the ratio of market value 
of assets over book value of assets, the change in the natural log of sales, and the change in profitability 
defined as operating income scaled by total assets. In Models 2 through 5 the Financing Deficit variable is 
interacted with the amount ofmisvaluation of the firm's equity at the file/issue date. For Models 2 and 3, 
the measure of misvaluation is the value-to-price ratio for the sample firm benchmarked by the average of 
the same ratio for the sample firm two years prior to the issue. Models 4 and 5 benchmark the sample firms 
value ratio with a ratio for an industry and size matched firm that did not issue. Under-valued Deficit is the 
financing deficit if the firm is under-valued relative to the benchmark, and zero otherwise. Over-valued 
Deficit is the financing deficit if the firm is over-valued relative to the benchmark, and zero otherwise. The 
quartile variables are defined similarly. P-values are reported in parenthesis .. 
Intercept 
Financing Deficit 
Under-Valued Deficit ( 1) 
Over-Valued Deficit (2) 
Under-Valued Lower Quartile (A) 
Under-Valued Middle Quartile (B) 
Over -Valued Middle Quartile ( C) 
Over-Valued Upper Quartile (D) 
ti Tangibles 
ti Market-to-book 
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Panel B: Test Difference of Coefficients (Table IX continued) 
F test: Coefficient 1 =2 34.97*** 6.15*** 
F test: Coefficient A=B 
F test: Coefficient B=C 
F test: Coefficient C=D 
F test: Coefficient A=D 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 

















not expected to see a coefficient of one as predicted by the pecking order theory, rather it 
should be 0.66 for the full sample. Similar to the FG result, all the independent variables 
have the expected sign and are significant at the one-percent level. The coefficient on 
financing deficit is larger (0.398) compared to FIG results (0.125) indicating that this 
sample of issuing firms more closely follows the pecking order theory. In addition, the 
model shows an insignificant intercept and an R2 of0.306 (FIG 0.219). Although, in this 
sample financing deficit better explains net debt issues and the importance of the 
conventional leverage variables cannot be dismissed. 
Models 2 and 4 incorporate the valuation-financing deficit interacted variable in 
the regression.23 Both, the under-valued variable coefficient (0.52181) and the over-
valued variable coefficient (0.32027) are significant at the one-percent level. The two 
coefficients are also significantly different from each other at the one.:.percent level. This 
provides evidence that undervalued firms are more likely to issue debt to reduce their 
23 Models 2 and 3 use the time-series benchmark and Models 4 and 5 use the matching sample benchmark. 
Again, only the results of the time-series benchmark are discussed in the text of the paper. The matching 
sample benchmark results are presented in the table, however, for reasons discussed earlier, less emphasis 
is placed on this benchmark. 
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financing deficit, while overvalued companies are more likely to resort to equity 
issuance. All the other independent variables remain significant at the one-percent level 
except for the change in the natural log of net sales indicating that the conventional 
leverage variables are still playing a significant role in the security decision choice. 
To test the robustness of the specification of Model 2, the financing deficit 
variable is divided into quartiles, based upon misvaluation of the firm's equity (Model 3 
and 5). In Model 3, the coefficients of all the quartile variables are significantly different 
from each other, except the difference between the two lower quartiles. This provides 
further evidence that firms that are overvalued are more likely to issue equity. The 
coefficients of the change in tangibility, the change in market-to-book ratio and the 
change in profitability are also still significant at the one-percent level, while the change 
in the log of net sales remains insignificant. Thus, by separating out the over- and under-
valued firms I find that the sensitivity of debt issues to the financing deficit is directly 
related to the degree to which equity is overvalued. The Frank and Goyal result, that net 
equity issues track the financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues may be 
interpreted as evidence in favor of the market timing hypothesis of capital structure rather 
than as evidence against the pecking order theory. 
E. Conclusions 
This paper examines directly the impact of equity valuation relative to price on 
the security issuance decision by using a residual income model to measure equity value. 
This approach has the advantage over the use of market-to-book ratios as a proxy for 
valuation, that it allows separation of the effects of growth opportunities and 
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misvaluation. This cannot be achieved through the use of market-to-book ratios alone. 
Using this method of measuring misvaluation, the security decision choice is examined in 
light .of the extant theories of capital structure, including the market timing hypothesis. 
This study finds evidence indicating that firm managers use timing strategies based upon 
misvaluation of common equity when issuing straight debt or common equity. 
The analysis uses three different approaches. First, I test how well the 
misvaluation measure predicts the likelihood that managers will issue a particular type of 
security, using a logistic regression. The empirical results indicates that firms that are 
overvalued are more likely to issue equity, while those that are undervalued issue debt. 
These results are consistent with the market timing hypothesis of capital structure. 
Second, I am running a horse race in which the three theories of capital structure 
have an opportunity to reveal their relative impact on the security issuance decision. As a 
result, the outcome is not restricted to finding results in favor of just one theory. It is 
perfectly plausible that all the theories may be operating together at some time. Again, 
the results demonstrate evidence consistent with the market timing hypothesis of capital 
structure. Firms that are overvalued are more likely to issue equity, while undervalued 
firms tend to issue debt. In addition, the results also find some support the static tradeoff 
theory and pecking order theory. Firms that are below the historic debt level will issue 
debt, after controlling for market valuation. Furthermore, firms that presumably have a 
lower cost of debt will issue debt rather than equity. 
Third, the Frank and Goyal study is examined in light of market timing. The 
evidence indicates that the sensitivity of debt issues to the financing deficit is directly 
related to the degree to which equity is overvalued. Greater overvaluation implies equity 
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issuance, and only for undervalued firms the response to the financing deficit is much 
more in line with the pecking order theory. 
The security issuance choice between public and private debt is determined more 
by the characteristics of the firm than the level ofmisvaluation. The younger, riskier 
firms, seeking smaller amounts of capital tend to place debt in private markets, given that 
firms issue straight debt. 
In summary, although this study does not reject the two main theories of capital 
structure, it is evident that valuation of equity plays a major role, if not a dominant role, 
in the security decision choice. These results are consistent with the Baker and Wurgler 
ad hoc theory of market timing which asserts that capital structure is the cumulative 
. outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. 
However, future research to further examine the timing hypothesis of capital . 
structure is desirable. One useful approach to gain more insight into the nature of timing 
would be to investigate the firm's stock performance after the issuance of overvalued 
equity. If firms issue common equity securities to invest the proceeds in positive NPV 
project the firm's long-term stock performance should increase. However, if firms issue 
equity just to take advantage of the overvaluation, the long-term stock performance is 
expected to decline. 
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CHAPTER2 
Valuation Errors in Equity and the Motives for Issuing Convertible Debt 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine managerial motives behind the issuance 
of convertible debt securities. Previous literature analyzing the security choice decision 
mainly focuses on the choice between straight debt and common equity. However, 
examining hybrid securities such as convertible debt can add to the understanding of why 
firm managers choose to issue a specific security type. The hybrid nature of convertible 
debt comes from the fact that it possesses both the fixed income characteristics of straight 
debt as well as the potential to increase in value by the conversion feature to common 
equity. Since the convertible bond exhibits characteristics of both (simple) securities, 
what then is the motive of management to issue convertible debt instead of straight debt 
or common equity? Although, there is no unified theory that explains the motives for 
convertible debt as the security choice, the literature provides several hypotheses. 
First, the risk-shifting or asset-substitution hypothesis as proposed by Green 
(1984) argues that issuance of convertible debt reduces the agency conflict between 
bondholders and stockholders. When a firm has risky debt outstanding managers can 
transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders by over-investing in risky projects. 
Adverse investment decisions can be mitigated, assuming full conversion, by increasing 
the proportion of common equity owned by convertible debt holders. Brennan and 
Schwartz (1988) examine the convertible debt issues in light of risk-shifting using an 
asymmetric information based argument. They argue that the underlying motivation to 
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issue convertible bonds is induced by the value of the bond's relative insensitivity to 
company risk. 
Second, the backdoor-equity hypothesis articulated by Stein (1992) asserts that 
issuance of convertible debt is an indirect form of equity financing chosen to alleviate the 
adverse selection costs associated with asymmetric information. It provides an 
alternative financing vehicle which is able to lower the high expected cost of financial 
distress associated with a debt issue and, at the same time, avoid some of the large 
negative announcement costs observed with an equity issue. 
The third hypothesis explaining the convertible debt issue choice conjectures that 
convertible debt can be used as a means to lower coupon interest rates. Billingsley and 
Smith (1996) conduct a survey and report that firm managers primarily choose to issue 
convertible debt to lower the coupon interest rate, thus using the issue as a so called 
straight debt-sweetener. Empirical evidence reveals contrary results with regard to these 
hypotheses and the question why managers choose to issue convertible debt has to be 
resolved yet. 24 
An alternative way to address the convertible debt subject is by analyzing the 
timing of issuance. Several researchers have analyzed whether market-related strategies 
such as hot issue markets also apply to convertible debt issues. Alexander, Stover, and 
Kuhnau ( 1979) estimate the relationship between convertible debt issues and lagged 
equity market returns. Although, they are able to predict very short periods of hot and 
24 Billingsley, Lamy, and Thompson (1988) find evidence that balance sheets of convertible debt issuers are 
more like those of debt than equity issuers. However, their risk/return complexion is more like that of 
equity issuers. Brennan and Schwartz (1988) show that firms with high uncertainty about their equity risk 
issue convertible debt as a substitute for straight debt in order to reduce the effects of adverse selection 
costs. Billingsley and Smith (1996) report that debt-sweetening is the most important reason for firm 
managers to issue convertible debt. They also report a declining trend on issuance of convertible debt as 
delayed equity. 
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cold markets for convertible debt issues, their evidence does not indicate that conversion 
features are more appealing when equity markets have risen. They provide two 
explanations for their findings (1) firms are probably not able to exploit the short periods 
of favorable issuing time, or (2) motives other than minimizing the marginal cost of 
capital are more important in the convertible debt decision choice. Mann, Moore and 
Ramanlal (1999) also examine the timing issue and observe that variation around the 
mean of total aggregate convertible debt issues in the period from 1966 to 1993 is 
significant, suggesting that timing plays a role in the security choice. They report that 
firms issue convertible debt when equity markets have risen or when market interest rates 
have increased. They interpret the results as evidence for the existence of 'hot issue 
markets'. Their analysis does not find support for the backdoor-equity hypothesis. 
In addition to the above mentioned theories there are several empirical studies 
reporting that the average stock price reaction to convertible debt issue announcements 
lies somewhere between the average stock price reaction of straight debt and that of 
common equity offers. 25 These results imply that convertible debt issuers might have 
characteristics of both, common equity and straight debt issuers. Lewis, Rogalski and 
Seward (1999), henceforth LRS, examine the characteristics of convertible debt issuers 
based upon the likelihood that the bond is converted into common equity. Consistent 
with the risk shifting and backdoor equity hypothesis, their evidence indicates that 
convertible debt is either issued as a substitute for common equity or as a substitute for 
straight debt. Firms with valuable, risky investment opportunities are more likely to issue 
convertible debt as a substitute for straight debt, while firms with valuable investment 
25 See Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Eckbo (1986), Essig (1991) and Asquith 
(1995). 
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opportunities, but a large degree of asymmetric information, are more likely to use 
convertible debt issues as a substitute for common equity. 
This paper investigates the existing theories explaining managerial motives 
behind the issuance of convertible debt securities. Using the method developed by LRS 
(1999) to distinguish between 'debt-like' issuers and 'equity-like' issuers of convertible 
debt, we test whether valuation errors at the time of the security issue announcement date 
play a significant role in the security decision choice. The conjecture is that levels of 
misvaluation within the convertible debt sample might vary significantly among debt-like 
and equity-like convertible debt issues because of different underlying reasons 
determining the security choice. 
This study analyzes the motivation behind the issuance of convertible debt 
securities with a sample of U.S. convertible bonds issued between 1971 and 1998. The 
backdoor equity hypothesis, the risk-shifting hypothesis, and the timing hypothesis are 
tested using valuation errors at the time of security issuance. The empirical findings are 
consistent with the backdoor equity hypothesis and the risk-shifting hypothesis. 
However, no evidence is found to support the timing hypothesis. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section B reviews the literature on convertible 
debt and develops the hypotheses, section C describes the data and method, section D 
reports the results, and section E concludes. 
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B. Convertible Debt Theories; Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
1. The Risk-shifting Hypothesis 
The general consensus concerning the motivation to issue convertible debt among 
financial practitioners for a long time was that convertible debt is a cheaper form of 
financing compared to straight debt or common equity. The idea was that it allowed 
management to issue a security with a coupon rate below that of straight debt and that 
stock could be sold at a premium over the current stock price. Brennan and Schwartz 
(1988) point out that this is an erroneous belief and provide an example showing that the 
argument holds only because convertible bonds are compared to straight debt when 
company performance is poor and are compared to common equity when the firm 
performs well. In addition, the cost of the convertible bond is higher than just the coupon 
interest rate because of the attachment of conversion rights. A better way to look at its 
costs is as a weighted average of the explicit interest charges and the implicit opportunity 
costs associated with the equity option. If convertible debt is not just a cheaper source of 
financing, than the question remains why do firms issue convertible debt? 
The risk-shifting hypothesis may provide one explanation to this puzzle. Green 
(1984) develops the risk-shifting theory using an agency-based argument, while Brennan 
and Schwartz's (1988) argument is based on asymmetric information. The agency-based 
version of the risk-shifting theory states that when a firm has risky debt outstanding 
shareholders can transfer wealth from bondholders by over-investing in risky projects. 
The increased risk associated with these projects is borne by the bondholders. When the 
project returns the expected higher cash flows, the profits accrue to the shareholders. 
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Green develops a model in which he demonstrates that convertible debt can mitigate the 
agency costs induced by the negative effects when risky debt is issued. 
The reasoning of Brennan and Schwartz (1988) is based on the premise that the 
advantage of convertible debt as the security choice over straight debt or common equity 
stems from the fact that its value is relative insensitive to changes in company risk. 
Firms with high operating risk and hard to determine risks associated with future 
operations usually face high cost of straight debt. The value of a bond will decrease with 
an increase in risk, i.e. debt will become more expensive as a source of financing for the 
firm. Attaching a conversion option to the bond, i.e. issuing convertible debt, the cost of 
external financing can be reduced. Firms with higher operating and financial risk usually 
face more volatile stock prices. The higher cost of debt is mitigated by the increase in the 
value of the option induced by greater stock volatility.26 Brennan and Schwartz postulate 
that firms issuing convertible debt are perceived to be risky by the market because their 
operating risk and/or investment policy is hard to assess. Several empirical studies 
support the risk-shifting hypothesis as an explanation for managerial motives to issue 
convertible debt. Mikkelson (1981) examines stock return patterns after convertible debt 
calls and reports that highly levered firms (read high risk) with high growth opportunities 
(i.e. more uncertain future operations) are more likely to issue convertible debt. Chew 
(1984) reports similar findings. His evidence indicates that on average those firms which 
are younger, smaller, more rapidly growing, and are having higher market and earnings 
variability issue convertible debt. Lewis et al. (1998) analyze the convertible debt design 
to more fully understand the motives underlying the convertible debt security choice. 
26 See Black and Scholes (1972) option pricing model for the relationship between the value of the option 
and volatility. 
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Consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis, they report that convertible bonds are 
constructed such that the greater the opportunity for stockholders to expropriate 
bondholder value through risk increasing investment projects, the larger the proportion of 
common equity owned by convertible bondholders, assuming full conversion. Firms 
with high debt levels must give a larger proportion of equity ownership to debt holders in 
order to reduce risk-shifting incentives. 
According to the risk-shifting hypothesis the advantage of convertible debt over 
straight debt or common equity stems from the fact that it can (1) resolve conflicts 
between bondholders and shareholders with regards to adverse investment decisions, and 
(2) mitigate the high costs of debt associated with uncertainty about a firm's existing and 
future operating risk. Note that the stock price at the time of the security decision choice 
has no influence on the security decision choice. Based on the predictions of the risk-
shifting hypothesis, I hypothesize that valuation errors of equity at the security issue 
announcement date are random and no systematic under- or over-valuation is expected. 
2. The Backdoor Equity Hypothesis 
The backdoor equity hypothesis, as proposed by Stein (1992), is an asymmetric 
based information theory in which a firm's equity value at the time of the security 
decision choice plays an important role. The premise is that firms with high financial 
distress costs and high uncertainty about their equity risk resort to convertible debt as a 
backdoor to increase the amount of equity in their capital structure. Firms use this 
alternative way of financing to avoid the costs of financial distress associated with high 
leverage and to reduce the negative announcement effects reported with the sale of 
common equity. Consistent with the backdoor equity hypothesis are the results of early 
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surveys that try to explain management's motivation for using convertible debt. Pilcher 
(1955) finds that 82% of the survey's respondents mentioned delayed equity as the main 
reason to issue convertible debt. Brigham (1966).reports similar results; in his survey 
73% of the respondents chose convertible debt as a delayed equity issue, while 27% 
chose convertible debt to lower the coupon rate. Hoffmeister's (1977) survey also 
mentioned delayed equity and reduction of coupon rate as the two main reasons to issue 
convertible bonds. However, there was not a clear distinction between these two 
motives. 
An important implication of the backdoor equity hypothesis is that firms only 
issue convertible debt if they are optimistic about the future outlook of the firm, i.e. they 
expect the stock price to go up so debt will be converted into common equity. In practice 
there are two possible ways conversion takes place. One, investors can convert their 
bonds voluntarily into common equity when the stock price reaches the conversion price 
or two, firm managers can force conversion by calling back the bond if a call feature is 
attached to the issue. Most convertible bonds are issued with a call feature attached to 
them. Stein (1992) points out that this call feature cannot be explained by the risk-
shifting theory, but is clearly justified by management's use of convertible debt as a 
backdoor to increase the amount of equity in their capital structure. 
Assuming the motivation behind a convertible debt issue is to increase equity 
capital, one would expect those firms with high costs of financial distress, i.e. highly 
levered firms, with good investment opportunities, and undervalued equity to issue 
(callable) convertible debt. Empirical evidence for this implication of the backdoor 
equity hypothesis is provided by several studies. Broman ( 1963) reports that firms 
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issuing convertible debt have higher debt/equity ratios than firms issuing straight debt. 
Essig ( 1991) examines the characteristics of convertible debt issuers and finds that firms 
issuing convertible debt have, on average, high debt ratios, large growth opportunities, 
and volatile cash flows, which are proxies for high financial distress costs and high 
asymmetric information. Billingsley et al. (1988) analyze the security decision choice 
between straight debt, convertible debt and common equity and model convertible debt in 
comparison with straight debt and with common equity. Their poorest performing model 
is convertible debt versus common equity. They interpret these results as being 
consistent with the backdoor equity hypothesis. Due to the similarity of both securities, 
they reason that convertible debt is issued as a substitute for common equity. Lewis et al. 
(1999) examine an 'equity like' sample of convertible debt issuers, i.e. a sample of 
issuers that substitute convertible debt for common equity. Consistent with the backdoor 
equity hypothesis, their evidence indicates that convertible debt issuers have more 
profitable investment opportunities and face higher asymmetric information than equity 
issuers. However, with regards to the financial distress costs argument, their evidence is 
mixed. Convertible debt issuers do not portray the expected higher debt levels. In fact, 
their evidence indicates the opposite, equity issuers are more highly levered than 
convertible debt issuers. 
The implication of the backdoor equity theory that the bond is expected to be 
converted into equity before or at maturity has empirical support in the literature. 
Asquith (1991) reports that large fractions of convertible bonds are converted into equity 
relatively fast after the issue and eventually two-thirds of all convertible debt issues in his 
sample are converted. Lewis et al. (1998) examine the security design of convertible debt 
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and find that convertible debt issues have less call protection than straight debt issues and 
that the shorter the call protection, the better the future prospects of the firm. In addition, 
those issues with high levels of post conversion equity have on average lower conversion 
premiums and are of shorter maturities, i.e. have a higher probability of conversion. 
According to the backdoor equity hypothesis, convertible debt is only issued 
when managers are more optimistic than investors about future stock price performance. 
Thus, while firm managers would rather issue equity, they issue convertible debt instead 
due to their perceived undervaluation of equity. Therefore, I hypothesize that valuation 
errors of equity are expected to have a significant impact in explaining the security 
decision choice when convertible bonds are issued as a substitute for common equity. 
3. Convertible Debt as a Sweetener of Coupon Interest Rates 
The debt sweetener hypothesis of convertible debt assumes that firm managers 
issue this hybrid security to lower the coupon interest rate of the bond. Investors are 
willing to pay a premium for the option allowing them, when specific conditions are met, 
to convert the bond into common equity. Therefore, all else equal, the coupon rate of the 
convertible bonds is lower than that of a straight bond. 
The early surveys conducted in the 1950s and 1960s examining management 
motivation to issue convertible debt, find that only about 21 % of the respondents report 
lowering of the bond's coupon rate as the most important reason to issue convertible debt. 
In those years delayed equity was given as the most important reason to explain the 
choice of convertible debt. Using a later sample of issuing firms Melicher and 
Hoffmeister (1977), however, report contrasting results. They observe that the most 
important reason to issue convertible debt in the 1970s is reduction of coupon interest 
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rates, while an increase of salability and marketability of the issue is the second most 
important reason. Using a more recent conducted survey among convertible debt issuers 
between 1987 and 1993, Billingsley and Smith (1996) also examines the different 
hypotheses explaining convertible debt issues. They report findings consistent with those 
ofMelicher and Hoffmeister (1977) such that convertible debt is primarily used as a 
substitute for straight debt to lower the coupon interest rate. Out of the 85 respondents to 
their survey, 48.3% report lower coupon rates as the most influential factor in the 
decision to issue convertible debt. This evidence is consistent with the idea that 
motivation to issue a particular security might change over time, depending on the firm's 
internal and external environment. 
4. Convertible Debt and Market Timing 
The concept of market timing in relation to security issuance implies that it is 
more advantageous to bring a security to the market at certain times than at other times. 
In recent literature, timing of straight debt and common equity issues have received 
ample attention. However, the timing of convertible debt issues has only been examined 
sparsely. Alexander, Stover and Kuhnau (1979) examine the existence of "hot issue" 
markets for convertible debt. They were able to predict cold-hot markets for convertible 
debt issues by examining price behavior of convertible debt issues using residual analysis 
to control for general market conditions. However, they did not find evidence that firm 
managers use timing strategies to exploit these hot markets for convertible debt. They 
provide two rationales for the absence of timing strategies. One, market timing is simply 
not possible in practice due to the short periods of favorable issuing time or two, firm 
managers have more important goals to achieve than trying to issue convertible debt 
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when financial markets are hot for convertible debt issues. Mann, Moore, and Ramanlal 
(1999) observe that variation around the mean of aggregate convertible debt issues in the 
period from 1966 to 1993 is significant, indicating that timing plays a role in the security 
decision choice. They regress the aggregate proportion of publicly issued debt with 
conversion features on the lagged values of convertible bond issues, the market return, 
changes in market volatility, and changes in the interest levels. Contrary to the findings 
of Alexander et al. (1979) their evidence indicates the existence of extended periods of 
hot markets for convertible debt issues. They find a positive, significant relationship 
between the return on common equity and the issuance of convertible debt. Firm 
managers are more likely to issue convertible debt when equity markets have risen and 
seem to engage in market timing. Indeed, there seems to be some belief among 
investment bankers that during equity bull markets convertible debt is easier to sell than 
straight debt. In rising equity markets, investors are afraid to miss out on the expected 
future profits associated with investments in common equity and they are more likely to 
invest in equity than debt. Attaching conversion features to debt issues makes it is easier 
to entice investors to buy debt because they are still able to reap the potential profits from 
rising equity prices. 
If managers issue convertible debt because it is easier to sell than straight debt 
during specific time periods, it must be obvious that the issue is a substitute for straight 
debt and not a means to issue equity via a backdoor. In equity bull markets, equity is 
more likely to be overvalued relative to its intrinsic value than in bear markets. If 
management would like to increase the amount of equity in their capital structure, it 
would be more logical to just issue common equity using the 'front door' instead of a 
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more uncertain backdoor. Assuming that management uses timing strategies during the 
security issuance choice, I hypothesize that equity is significantly overvalued at the time 
of a convertible debt issue. 
Table X summarizes the predictions for the risk-shifting, backdoor equity, and 
market timing hypotheses in relation to the use of valuation errors in common equity at 
the time of security issuance. 
TABLEX 
Predictions of the Alternative Convertible Debt Hypotheses in 
Relation to Valuation Errors at the Time of Security Issuance 
(1) The risk-shifting hypothesis (Green, 1984, Brennan and Schwartz, 1988) 
H 1: Valuation errors in common equity do not have a significant role in the security 
decision choice of convertible debt at the file/issue date and valuation errors in equity are random 
without any systematic over- or under-valuation present. 
HA: Systematic under- or over-valuation is present at the file/issue date. 
(2) The backdoor equity hypothesis (Stein, 1992) 
H2: Valuation errors in common equity do have a significant role in the security 
decision choice of convertible debt at the file/issue date and there is systematic undervaluation 
present. 
HA: Equity is not undervalued relative to its intrinsic value at the file/issue date and 
there is no systematic undervaluation present. 
(3) The timing hypothesis (Alexander et al., 1979, Mann et al., 1999) 
H3: Valuation errors in common equity do have a significant role in the security 
decision choice of convertible debt at the file/issue date and there is systematic overvaluation 
present. 
HA: Equity is not overvalued relative to its intrinsic value at the file/issue date and there 
is no systematic overvaluation present. 
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C. Data and Method 
1. Sample Selection 
The initial sample consists of all non-financial, U.S. firms that issue convertible 
debt during the period 1971-1998. Financial companies are excluded from the sample 
due to the highly regulated environment in which they operate (SIC codes 6000 to 6799). 
File/issue dates and issue specific variables are obtained from Securities Data 
Corporation's (SDC) Global New Issues database.27 Issuances of firms with multiple 
offers during the sample period are separated by at least three years. In the event that 
there are less than three years between offers only the first issue is allowed into the 
sample.28 This yields an initial sample of 701 companies. In addition, all firms are 
required to have relevant data available on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
database (CRSP) and Standard and Poor's Research Insight annual database 
(COMPUSTAT). To compute the valuations of the residual income valuation model for 
the issue year and the two years prior to the issue each firm must have six years of 
continuous data available on COMPUSTAT. This approach leaves a final sample of 408 
firms. The market price at the file/issue date is computed as the average of the closing 
stock price (CRSP) for the two days prior to the file/issue date. Treasury bond rates are 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank. 
27 The file date is used as the issue announcement date. Random sampling from the sample revealed that 
the announcement date falls on or within one day of the file date. For those firms where the file date 
cannot be obtained the issue date is used. 
28 Six firms had multiple issues within three years. 
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2. The Dependent Variable 
As discussed before, convertible debt can be a substitute for straight debt or for 
common equity. Firms that issue convertible debt that is likely to be converted into 
equity at maturity are more probable to use the issue as a substitute for common equity. 
On the other hand, firms that issue convertible debt with a low probability of conversion 
are more likely to use the security as a substitute for straight debt. To distinguish 
between the different convertible debt issues in the sample, the risk neutral probability of 
converting a convertible debt issue into equity at maturity is calculated. A continuous 
variable on the interval (0, 1) is created using an approach similar to the one developed by 
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999). The full sample is divided on basis of the 
probability of conversion. Firms with a probability of conversion less than 0.5, and firms 
with a probability greater than or equal to 0.5, i.e. firms issuing convertible debt as a 
substitute for straight debt or a substitute for common equity. 
Assuming that the underlying stock follows a Geometric Brownian Motion 
diffusion process, the probability of conversion is calculated as N( d2). 
Where, 
d = ln(S I X)+(r-div-a 2 !2)T 
2 r;;; ' av T 
(8) 
and NO is the cumulative probability under a standard normal distribution. 
In this equation Sis the current price of the underlying stock at the file/issue date, 
Xis the conversion price, r is the continuously compounded yield estimated from a 10-
year U.S. Treasury bond on the file/issue date, div is the issuing firm's continuously 
compounded dividend yield for the fiscal year end preceding the offer date, <J is the 
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standard deviation of the continuously compounded common equity return estimated over 
the period 240 to 40 trading days prior to the file/issue date, and T is the number of years 
until maturity for the convertible bond. If r-div is negative the risk-neutralized drift will 
be equal to zero. 
Figure II shows the empirical distribution of the full sample. The distribution has 
a mean of 0.51 and a median of 0.49. The minimum probability of conversion is 0.04 and 
the maximum is 0.99. 
Figure II 
Empirical Distribution of the Risk Neutral Probability of Conversion 
Figure II shows the empirical distribution of the risk neutral probability of conversion at the issue time for 






Bifurcating the sample on the basis of the probability of conversion allows for 
testing the discussed hypotheses using valuation errors at the time of issuance. 
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3. The Independent Variables 
The key independent variable for testing the hypotheses in Table X is a measure 
of valuation of the firm's common equity at the file/issue date. Most studies employ 
market-to-book ratios as a proxy for valuation. However, it is well documented that 
market-to-book ratios as a valuation measure incorporate noise. Not only does it serve as 
a proxy for valuation, it also can be interpreted as a proxy for growth opportunities or 
asymmetric information.29 In order to separate growth opportunities, asymmetric 
information and pure valuation, this study utilizes a residual income valuation model to 
calculate the intrinsic value of the firm's equity. The residual income model is similar to 
the dividend discount model but has the advantage that it uses accounting numbers which 
makes it more practical for implementation. 30 This paper directly measures misvaluation 
using the method employed by D'Mello and Shroff (2000) and Jindra (2001) who use the 
ratio of intrinsic value of the stock price to the current market price. Use of this valuation 
ratio has several advantages. First, there is no need to rely on the market model and the 
well documented potential problems relating to the use of daily stock returns in event 
studies can be avoided.31 Second, previous literature has not only documented abnormal 
performance in the short-run, but also in the long-run. The residual income model allows 
for capturing both, short-run and long-run effects. Last, assuming perfect foresight by 
managers allows the use of ex-post 
29 Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) find that market to book ratios have very little economic 
predictability of stock returns compared to valuation measures incorporating time varying interest rates and 
earnings. 
30 Ohlson (1990, 1991, and 1995) demonstrates the relationship between the dividend discount model and 
the residual income model. 
31 See Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), Corrado and Zivney (1992), and MacKinlay (1997) for a detailed 
discussion on the use of daily stock returns in event studies. 
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data, avoiding reliance on estimates used in event study methodology. Using ex-post 
data does not rule out the possibility that management may manipulate accounting data 
and therefore influence the results. However, to ameliorate this problem, the valuation 
ratio is scaled by the average valuation ratio for the subject firm from the two years prior 
to the issue. 
The equity value estimates in the residual income model are based on future 
realized earnings performance. The basic model determines the intrinsic value by adding 
to book value the discounted expected earnings in excess of normal return on book value. 
(9) 
Where TV, the terminal value, is calculated as 
TV= E[(X o+r - r * Bo+r-i) + (X O+T+I - r * Bo+r )] I 2 (10) 
E(V0) in this equation is the value of the firm's equity at time zero, Bo is the book 
value at time zero, r is the cost of equity, and Xi are the firms earnings at time zero plus i. 
Time zero is the time at the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the file/issue 
date, and T equals two years. 
The cost of equity, r, is estimated using the Fama and French (1997) method in 
which each firm is assigned the cost of equity of one of forty-eight industry groups 
computed using the Fama French three factor model. The short-term T-bill is used as a 
proxy for the risk-free rate of interest. Lee et al. (1999) report that both, the short-term T-
Bill rates and the long-term Treasury bonds rates are useful proxies for the level of 
interest rate. However, estimates ofV based on the short-term T-Bill rate outperform 
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those based on the long-term T-bond rates because they have a lower standard deviation 
and a faster rate of mean reversion. TV is calculated as the average of the last two years 
of the finite series and is restricted to be nonnegative. The estimated intrinsic value of 
the stock is then compared to the market value of the stock at the file/issue date to 
determine the valuation error. Estimated misvaluation is measured as, 
M = E(Vo) 
0 P, ' 
0 
(11) 
Where Mo represents the estimated misvaluation at time zero, Po represents the 
market price of the stock at time zero, and VO represents the intrinsic value of the stock at 
time zero. The estimated misvaluation measure of the sample firm is then scaled by the 
two-year average misvaluation of the same firm prior to the file/issue date as shown in 
equation 12. M0_1 and M0_2 are the misvaluation measures for the two years prior to the 
issue. 
(12) 
If no misvaluation is present, TSVP should equal 1. If TSVP is less than one the 
sample firm is over-valued relative to its previous two years. A TSVP value greater than 
one indicates a firm that is under-valued relative to its previous two years. 
In order to determine the impact of valuation errors in common equity as 
predicted by the hypotheses in table X, the full sample will be divided into two sub-
samples. Those firms issuing convertible debt as a substitute for straight debt, from this 
point on called the risk-shifters, and those issuing convertible debt as a substitute for 
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common equity, from this point on called the backdoor equity issuers. In both sub-
samples there is a need to control for those variables from which we know might have 
significant explanatory power in the convertible debt security decision choice. 
Risk-shifters issue convertible debt as a substitute for straight debt because their 
operating risk and future policies are hard to assess. Investment in smaller companies 
with high growth opportunities is not just perceived as more risky than investment than 
their larger, more mature counter parts, but also future investment risk for these firms is 
harder to predict. To control for company risk I include firm size and a proxy for growth 
opportunities. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total revenue scaled by 
total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date (COMPUSTAT variable 
D12/D6). Market-to-book serves as a proxy for growth opportunities and is calculated as 
the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets (COMPUSTAT variables ((D6-
D60)+(D24*D25))/D6. As additional risk proxies I also include the debt ratio, and credit 
quality. Highly financial levered firms may be tempted to over-invest in risky projects 
with the purpose to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders. In addition, the 
risk of default increases with an increase in leverage. Financial leverage is calculated as 
the ratio of total debt over total assets (COMPUSTAT variables (D44+D9)/D6). Credit 
quality also proxies for the firm's ability and incentive to shift risk since the greater the 
probability of financial distress, the greater the level of agency costs. Credit quality is a 
dummy variable based on the company's rating as given by Standard and Poors. It is 
equal to 1 if the firm has an 'A' rating, 2 if it has an 'AA' rating, up till 9 if it has a 'C' 
rating. A value of 10 is assigned if the company is not rated. Due to the fact that the 
difference between an 'AAA' rated bond and an 'AA' rated bond might not be viewed the 
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same as the difference between a 'BBB" rated bond and a 'BB' rated bond by some 
researchers, a second credit rating dummy variable is created as well. The dummy equals 
I when the convertible bond has a credit rating of 'BBB' or higher, i.e. investment grade 
status, and zero otherwise, i.e. non-investment grade status. To control for the fact that 
management might choose to issue convertible debt in order to lower the coupon rate of 
the bond, the market level of interest as measured by a IO-year Treasury Bond is added as 
an additional control variable. Also, the firms tax status, i.e. the potential tax benefit of 
debt, might influence the security decision choice. I construct two alternative measures 
as a proxy for the potential tax benefit. The first one is computed as the ratio of tax 
payments to total assets (COMPUSTAT variable D16/D6). The second one is a 
· trichotomous taxable income dummy developed by Graham (1996) This dummy equals 
the statutory rate for the top tax bracket if taxable income (COMPUSTAT D71) and net 
operating loss carry forward (COMPUSTAT D52) are positive. It equals half the 
statutory rate for the top tax bracket if only one of the two is positive and the other one is 
negative. It equals zero if both are negative.32 
Backdoor equity issuers choose convertible debt as the security issuance choice 
because they cope with high asymmetric information and increased financial distress 
costs. Firm size, dividend payout ratio, intangibles, and market-to-book are utilized as 
control variables to capture the asymmetric information content. Smaller firms receive 
less scrutinizing by financial analysts and are not as well covered by the media as large 
firms. Therefore, these firms are expected to have a higher level of asymmetric 
32 The top rate before1979 is 48%, 46% from 1979 to 1986, 39.5% in 1987, 34% from 1988 to 1992, and 
35% starting in 1993. The regression results using the alternative measure for potential tax benefits are 
very similar. This paper only reports the results using tax payments divided by total assets. 
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information. High dividend paying firms are assumed to be more transparent than low or 
non-dividend paying companies. The dividend payout ratio is calculated as the ratio of 
the amount of dividend paid out to net income at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue 
date (COMPSTAT variables D26/D58). In addition, firms with high levels of intangibles 
are more likely to have information problems. Intangibles are calculated as the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets (COMPUSTAT variables D33/D6). Since it is difficult 
for investors to quantify future investment opportunities, the degree of asymmetric 
information is expected to increase with the firm's growth opportunities. The market-to-
book ratio is included as a proxy for growth opportunities. I also include free cash flow 
scaled by total assets as a proxy for current profitability (COMPUSTAT variables 
(D123+D125-D127-D128)/D6). Availability of free cash flow is an indicator of the 
company's ability to service its current financial obligations. In addition, the market level 
of interest rate and the firm's tax benefit measure are also included. 
4. Testing the Hypotheses 
Employing the probability of conversion as a measure to distinguish between 
firms substituting convertible debt for straight debt and firms substituting convertible 
debt for common equity allows for testing the discussed hypotheses using valuation 
errors at the time of issuance. 
First, I use a Wilcoxon Rank Sums test, also named a Mann-Whitney test, to 
examine if the empirical distribution function of the various response variables have the 
same location parameter for both of the sub-samples of debt-like and equity-like issuers. 
Assuming that different firms issue convertible debt for different reasons, i.e. issue 
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convertible debt as a substitute for straight debt or a substitute for common equity, I 
would expect to find differences in the location parameters in terms of valuation, risk 
level, and the level of asymmetric information. Previous studies report that firms issuing 
common equity are generally more overvalued relative to their intrinsic value than firms 
issuing straight debt. Based on these findings in a univariate setting I would expect the 
backdoor equity issuers to be more overvalued relative to their intrinsic value than the 
risk-shifters. The expected differences in location parameters for the risk level and level 
of asymmetric information are more uncertain. Both, the risk-shifting and backdoor 
equity hypothesis include components based on the level of risk and asymmetric 
information. 
Second, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression equation that relates 
the risk neutral probability of conversion to the issuing firm's valuation measure and the 
full balance of control variables. To guard against heteroskedasticity all regressions are 
estimated using General Method of Moments (GMM) to obtain the unbiased White t-
statistics. 33 
Convj = /3o + /31 LTSVP3j + /32LnSizej + {33MBj + /34 Divrafj + /3s Intanm + /36 Fq 
+ /31 Debrat + f3s Ratingj + /39 Taxpmtj + /310 Iratej + ~ (13) 
where Convj, is the risk neutral probability that convertible debt issue j is converted into 
33 The GMM procedure provides an asymptotically unbiased estimation of the t-statistic without specifying 
the heteroskedastic structure of the regression equation. The t-statistics obtained using GMM are identical 
to those obtained using Ordinary least Squares in the absence ofheteroskedasticity. The regression 
coefficients are the same for both procedures. 
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equity at maturity, LTSVP3j is the natural log of the misvaluation measure, LnSizej is the 
natural log of firm size, MBj is the market-to-book ratio, Divratj is the dividend payout 
ratio, , Intangj are intangibles scaled by total assets, Fq is the level of free cash flow 
scaled by total assets, Debtralj is the debt ratio, Taxpmtj is the tax payment scaled by total 
assets, Iratej is the market level of interest rate, and Ratingj represents a dummy variable 
for credit quality at the file/issue date. This equation is first estimated for the full sample. 
If the three hypotheses in table X are mutually exclusive the risk-shifting hypothesis 
predicts LTSVP3 to have an insignificant impact, the backdoor equity hypothesis predicts 
a significant positive impact, and the market timing hypothesis predicts a significant 
negative impact. In addition, the equation is also estimated for the two sub-samples. If 
the tested hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, i.e. some firms issue convertible debt to 
mitigate costs associated with risk while others may want to issue equity via a backdoor, I 
would expect to see significant differences in the coefficients and signs of the control 
variables of the sub-samples compared to the full sample. 
Third, after bifurcating the full sample into firms substituting convertible debt for 
straight debt and firms substituting for common equity, I estimate for each sub-sample a 
cross-sectional regression equation which includes the key variable LTSVP3 and those 
control variables pertaining to the specific hypothesis tested. 




The risk-shifting hypothesis predicts that the value of the firm's common equity does not 
have a significant impact on the decision to issue convertible debt. Therefore, LTSVP3 is 
expected to be insignificant in explaining the security decision choice. The market 
timing hypothesis predicts that firms are more likely to issue convertible debt in equity 
bull markets. During equity bull markets it is easier to sell convertible debt to investors 
than straight debt because investors attain the opportunity to reap potential profits in the 
common equity market. Finding that equity is overvalued would provide evidence in 
favor of the timing hypothesis. Thus, consistent with the market timing hypothesis of 
convertible debt LSTVP3 is expected to be negative. 
For those firms substituting convertible debt for common equity the estimated 
regression 1s: 
Convj = {30 + (31 LTSVP3j + /32 LnSizej + (33 MBj + /34 Divratj + f3s Intangj + /36 Fq 
(15) 
The backdoor equity hypothesis postulates that firm managers would like to issue 
common equity however, due to perceived undervaluation of this equity they issue 
convertible debt with the intent to convert the issue into common equity in the future. 
Therefore, valuation errors in common equity are expected to have a significant impact 
on the security issue choice. Consistent with the backdoor equity hypothesis the 
predicted sign of LTSVP3 positive, i.e., the lower the valuation measure LTSVP3 the 
more likely the convertible debt issue is a substitute for common equity. 
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D. Results 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table XI shows the total number of issues by year for the full sample and the two 
sub-samples. The full sample contains 408 issues of which 221 issues have a probability 
of conversion less than 0.5 and 187 issues have a probability greater than or equal to 0.5. 
The number of total issues ranges from a low of zero (1971, 1973, 1974, and 1998) to a 
high of 46 (1986). Due to the requirement that each firm must have six years of CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT data prior to the file/issue date there are only a few observations in 
the early years of the sample. The requirement of three years of data after the file/issue 
date explains the remainder of zero firms out of the initial 22 obtained from SDC in 1998. 
The debt-like and equity-like sample both ranges from a low of zero to a high of 26, 
although the years are different, respectively 1987 and 1986. Interestingly, during the 
time period 1980 to 1986 the majority of issuers seem to substitute convertible debt for 
common equity (136 out of 198) while during the period 1987 to 1997 most of the issues 
are a substitute for straight debt (147 out 187) with the exception of 1989. 
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Table XI 
Summary Statistics by Year 
Table XI presents the total sample of all U.S. non-financial firms with required data 
available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT issuing public convertible debt between January 
1971 and December 1998. Issues done by the same company within three years of the 
file/issue date are deleted from the sample. 
Number of issues 
Year Full Sample Equity Like Sample Debt Like sample 
1971 0 0 0 
1972 1 1 0 
1973 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 0 
1975 1 0 1 
1976 3 1 2 
1977 3 1 2 
1978 2 1 1 
1979 13 7 6 
1980 25 16 9 
1981 26 18 8 
1982 18 15 3 
1983 32 21 11 
1984 16 15 1 
1985 35 25 10 
1986 46 26 20 
1987 35 9 26 
1988 13 4 9 
1989 23 14 9 
1990 14 4 10 
1991 19 3 16 
1992 24 0 24 
1993 21 3 18 
1994 8 1 7 
1995 12 1 11 
1996 10 0 10 
1997 8 1 7 
1998 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 
Total 408 187 221 
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Table XII provides the descriptive statistics of the issuing firm sample. Panel A_ 
report the sample characteristics for the full sample. The mean (median) stock price of 
the firm at the file/issue date is $25.36 ($23.75) and the mean (median) conversion price 
of the issue is $30.43 ($27.78). The average maturity of the convertible bond is 18 (20) 
years. The mean (median) valuation ratio for the issuing firm is 0.62 (0.51). The mean 
(median) of the valuation ratio scaled by the average valuation ratio for the sample firm 
during the two years prior to the issue (TSVP3) is 0.87 (0.74). Indicating that firms 
issuing convertible debt, compared to the average of the previous two years, are less 
overvalued at the file/issue date. On average a firm has $969 (260) million in net sales, a 
market-to-book ratio of 1.78 (1.49), intangibles of 4.6% (0.6%), negative free cash flow 
of -3% (-0.5%), and a dividend payout ratio of 18% (3%). The average debt ratio is 25% 
(25%) and the firm's tax benefit as measured by tax payments scaled by total assets on 
average is 4% (3%). The average market level of interest rate during the sample period is 
9.03% (8.26%). 
Panel Band Panel C of table XII report the same statistics for equity-like firms 
and debt-like firms, i.e. firms with a probability of conversion greater then or equal to 0.5 
and firms with a probability of conversion less then 0.5. Compared to the debt-like 
issuers equity-like issuers have on average a higher stock price at the file/issue date 
($27.83 vs. $23.28). Likewise, the bond has on average a higher conversion price 
($32.45 vs. $28.72) and the maturity of the bond for these equity-like issuers is 21.6 years 
versus 15.1 years for the debt-like issuers. The mean and the median of the valuation 




Table XII provides the summary statistics of a sample of all U.S. non-financial firms issuing public 
convertible debt between January 1971 and December 1998 with required data available on CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. TSVP3 is computed as SVP3 divided by AVG12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic value 
of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic 
value.· SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file or 
issue date if the file date is not available. A VG 12rly is the average of the SVP3 ratios in relative year -1 
and-2. Sprice is the closing stock price prior to the issue date. Convprc is the conversion price of the 
bond. Maturity is the number of years the till the conversion option expires. Prob is the risk natural 
probability of conversion. . Size is net revenue at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date scaled by 
total assets (D6). MB is market-to-book value calculated as total assets minus book value of equity plus 
market value of equity scaled by total assets ((D6-D60)+( d24*D25))/D6. Divrat is the dividend payout 
ratio (D26/D58). Intang is intangibles scaled by total assets (D33/D6). FC is free cash flow scaled by total 
assets (D123+D125-D127-D128)/D6. Debtrat is long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6). 
Rating is a dummy variable for the firm's credit rating according to Standard and Poors. The value of lis 
assigned to the highest credit rating and the value of 9 is assigned to the lowest credit rating. Taxpmt is the 
ratio of tax payments to total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date. Irate is the market 



























































Panel A: Total Issuers (prob (0,1)) 
Mean Median Std Dev 
0.62 0.51 0.47 
0.87 0.74 0.61 
0.51 0.49 0.20 
25.36 23.75 14.43 
30.43 27.78 17.27 
18.08 20.00 7.34 
968.74 260.12 2691.65 
1.78 1.49 0.90 
0.18 0.03 0.46 
0.25 0.25 0.16 
0.046 0.006 0.09 
-0.030 -0.005 0.96 
9.03 8.26 2.40 
0.04 0.03 0.03 
6.21 6.00 2.19 
Panel B: Equity Like Issuers (prob=>0.5) 
Mean Median Std Dev 
0.61 0.52 0.38 
0.79 0.72 0.39 
0.69 0.67 0.13 
27.83 25.88 13.97 
32.45 30.47 15.68 
21.60 25.00 5.29 
820.61 304.00 1607.89 
1.74 1.49 0.85 
0.16 0.09 0.25 
0.26 0.25 0.16 
0.045 0.010 0.089 
-0.025 -0.009 0.088 
































Panel B: Equity Like Issuers (prob=>0.5) (Table XII continued)) 
N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Taxpmt/d6 187 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.14 
Rating 187 5.93 6.00 2.24 2.00 10.00 
Panel C: Debt Like Issuers (prob<0.5) 
N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SVP3 221 0.62 0.50 0.54 0.09 4.92 
TSVP3 221 0.95 0.78 0.75 0.07 7.18 
Prob 221 0.36 0.38 0.10 0.04 0.49 
Sp rice 221 23.28 20.88 14.51 1.34 102.13 
Convprc 221 28.72 25.00 18.37 1.75 129.13 
Maturity 221 15.11 15.00 7.52 1.00 25.40 
Size 221 1094.45 191.03 3314.29 1.93 35209.00 
MB 221 1.82 1.52 0.94 0.71 5.66 
Divrat 181 0.19 0.00 0.60 0.00 6.66 
DebtRat 214 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.67 
Intang/d6 190 0.047 0.001 0.092 0.00 0.570 
FC/d6 219 -0.032 -0.003 0.103 -0.419 0.195 
Irate 221 8.06 7.37 2.01 5.19 14.04 
Taxpmt/d6 221 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.16 
Rating 221 6.45 6.00 2.12 2.00 10.00 
and 0.62 (0.50)) for the debt-like issuers. However, the mean (median) of the valuation 
ratio scaled by the average valuation ratio for the sample firm during the two years prior 
to the issue (TSVP3) differs significantly for both sub-samples, respectively 0.79 (0.72) 
for equity-like issuers and 0.95 (0.78) for debt-like issuers. Although both samples 
areless overvalued when scaled by the average valuation ratio for the sample firm during 
the two years prior to the issue, the mean of the equity-like sample is more overvalued 
than the mean of debt-like sample. Note however, the medians ofTSVP3 are much 
closer together and the univariate results for the means ofTSVP3 seem notably 
influenced by an undervalued outlier in the debt-like sample. The maximum value for 
TSVP3 for the equity-like sample is 2.80, but for the debt-like sample 7.18. On average 
the equity-like firms are smaller in terms of their means ($820 vs. $1094 million), but not 
in terms of their medians ($304 vs. $191 dollar). They have lower market-to-book ratios, 
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pay lower dividend as a function of net income, and have higher risk ratings. In addition, 
the market level of interest rate at the file/issue date is on average about 2% higher. 
Table XIII presents the results of a Wilcoxon Rank Sums test, which examines if 
the empirical distribution function of the various response variables has the same location 
parameter for both the debt-like and the equity-like issuers. Most of the explanatory 
Table XIII 
Test of Medians 
Table III presents the results of a Wilcoxon Rank Sums test, which examines if the empirical distribution 
function of the various response variables has the same location parameter for both the debt-like and the 
equity-like issuers. TSVP3 is computed as SVP3 divided by A VG 12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic 
value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the 
intrinsic value. SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to 
the file or issue date if the file date is not available. A VG 12rly is the average of the SVP3 ratios in relative 
year -1 and -2. Sprice is the closing stock price prior to the issue date. Convprc is the conversion price of 
the bond. Maturity is the number of years the till the conversion option expires. Prob is the risk natural 
probability of conversion. Size is net revenue at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date scaled by 
total assets (D6). MB is market-to-book value calculated as total assets minus book value of equity plus 
market value of equity scaled by total assets ((D6-D60)+( d24*D25))/D6. Divrat is the dividend payout 
ratio (D26/D58). Intang is intangibles scaled by total assets (D33/D6). FC is free cash flow scaled by total 
assets (D123+D125-D127-D128)/D6. Debtrat is long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6). 
Rating is a dummy variable for the firm's credit rating according to Standard and Poors. The value of lis 
assigned to the highest credit rating and the value of9 is assigned to the lowest credit rating. Taxpmt is the 
ratio of tax payments to total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date. Irate is the market 
level of interest rate at the file issue date proxied by the 10-year Treasury Bond. 
Variable Debt like issuers vs. Equity like issuers 
N Z-value p-value 
Prob.< 0.5 Prob=> 0.5 
SVP3 221 187 0.8156 0.42 
TSVP3 221 187 -1.8874* 0.06 
Sprice 221 187 3.6282*** <0.01 
Convprc 221 187 2.9672*** <0.01 
Maturity 221 187 8.1468*** <0.01 
MB 220 187 -0.4101 0.68 
Size 221 187 2.5601 *** 0.01 
Debtrat 214 181 1.000 0.32 
Divrat 181 174 3.2071 *** <0.01 
Intang 190 162 0.7170 0.47 
FC 219 183 0.2875 0.77 
Taxpmt 221 187 3.5148*** <0.01 
Irate 221 187 9.3271 *** <0.01 
Rating 221 187 -3.3703*** <0.01 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
97 
variables exhibit a significant difference between the two groups with regard to their 
medians. Equity-like issuers are more overvalued relative to the previous two-year 
average valuation ratio then debt-like issuers (p-value 0.06). This conforms to findings 
that firms issuing equity are generally more overvalued relative to their intrinsic value 
than firms issuing straight debt.34 Debt-like issuers of convertible debt are smaller in size 
compared to equity-like issuers (p-value 0.01). The level of risk for small firms is 
generally harder to assess than the risk level of large firms which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that risk-shifters substitute convertible debt for straight debt to mitigate costs 
associated with these higher levels of risk. The dividend payout ratio is significant at the 
one-percent level and is higher for the equity-like issuers than for the debt-like issuers. 
One explanation is that the dividend payout ratio measures the stability of expected future 
cash flows. Consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis, firms that substitute convertible 
debt for straight debt are expected to have high uncertainty with regard to future cash 
flows, i.e. low dividend payments. In the literature we also see that dividend payout ratio 
is used as a proxy for expected profitability. Again, consistent with the backdoor equity 
hypothesis, firm managers issuing convertible debt as a substitute for common equity 
anticipate having higher future earnings. Moreover, the firm's credit rating, tax shields 
and the market levels of interest rate are also significantly different between both groups 
at the one-percent level. 
34 Early studies by Masulis and Korwar (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986) Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
report significantly negative announcement date effects on equity prices. They interpret this finding as that 
equity is perceived overvalued by investors at the announcement date. These effects are not reported in the 
literature when straight debt is issued. Baker and Wurgler (2002) also find evidence that firms are more 
overvalued when issuing common equity than when issuing straight debt. 
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2. Multivariate Analysis: Initial Results 
Table XIV-A reports the parameters estimates and heteroskedastic consistent p-
values for regression equation (13) using General Method of Moments where the 
dependent variable is the risk neutral probability of conversion. 35 The three regressions 
reported in table XIV-A differ by the sample that is used in the estimation procedure. 
The estimation is performed for the full, the debt-like and the equity-like samples. First, 
note that included in this regression are all the control variables based on the theory of the 
alternative hypotheses tested. If the hypotheses are mutually exclusive or if the risk 
neutral probability of conversion is not a good metric for separating out the debt-like 
issuers from the equity-like issuers, one would expect to see similar signs and 
significance of the parameter estimates of the sub-samples compared to the full sample. 
However, the explanatory power and signs of the parameter estimates for the full sample 
and the two sub-samples appear to be different. Consistent with the finding ofLRS 
(1999) this suggests that the alternative convertible debt hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive and that the risk neutral probability of conversion might provide a good metric 
to separate debt-like and equity-like issuers. For equity-like issuers the key explanatory 
variable LTSVP3 is positive and significant. Consistent with the backdoor equity 
hypothesis of Stein (1992), this indicates the more undervalued the firm the higher the 
probability of conversion and the more likely the convertible debt issue is a substitute for 
common equity. 
35 Table XIV-B reports the results of the parameter estimates and heteroskedastic consistent p-values using 
the investment grade dummy variable as a proxy for credit rating. The results are very similar. 
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Table XIV-A 
Cross-sectional Regressions Results 
Table XIV-A provides the estimates from ordinary least square regressions with heteroskedastic 
consistent p-values. The dependent variable is the risk neutral probability of conversion (prob). 
Regression Coefficients are reported with p-values in parentheses. TSVP3 is computed as SVP3 
divided by AVG12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic value of the share price divided by SPRC 
using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. SPRC is the 
prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file date or issue 
date when file date is not available. AVG12rly is the average of the SVP3 ratios in relative year-1 
and -2. Sprice is the closing stock price prior to the file/issue date. LTSVP3 is the natural 
logarithm ofTSVP3. Size is net revenue at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date scaled by 
total assets (D6). MB is market-to-book value calculated as total assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity scaled by total assets ((D6--D60)+(d24*D25))/D6. Divrat is the 
dividend payout ratio (D26/D58). Intang is intangibles scaled by total assets (D33/D6). FC is free 
cash flow scaled by total assets (D123+Dl25-D127-D128)/D6. Debtrat is long-term debt 
(D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6). Rating is a dummy variable for the firm's credit rating 
according to Standard and Poors. The value of lis assigned to the highest credit rating available and 
the value of9 is assigned to the lowest credit rating available. Taxpmt is the ratio of tax payments to 
total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date. Irate is the market level of interest rate 
at the file issue date proxied by the 10-year Treasury Bond. 
Independent All Issuers Debt Like Issuers 
variable (prob. < 0.5) 




































*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
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Equity Like Issuers 


























Cross-sectional Regressions Results 
Table XIV-B provides the estimates from ordinary least square regressions with heteroskedastic 
consistent p-values. The dependent variable is the risk neutral probability of conversion (prob). 
Regression Coefficients are reported with p-values in parentheses. TSVP3 is computed as SVP3 
divided by A VG 12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic value of the share price divided by SPRC 
using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. SPRC is the 
prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file date or issue 
date when file date is not available. A VG 12rly is the average of the SVP3 ratios in relative year -1 
and -2. Sprice is the closing stock price prior to the file/issue date. LTSVP3 is the natural 
logarithm ofTSVP3. Size is net revenue at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date scaled by 
total assets (D6). MB is market-to-book value calculated as total assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity scaled by total assets ((D6-D60)+(d24*D25))/D6. Divrat is the 
dividend payout ratio (D26/D58). Intang is intangibles scaled by total assets (D33/D6). FC is free 
cash flow scaled by total assets (D123+D125-Dl27-D128)/D6. Debtrat is long-term debt 
(D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6). InvRating is a dummy variable for the firm's credit rating 
according to Standard and Poors. The value of lis assigned to bond ratings 'BBB' or higher and zero 
otherwise. Taxpmt is the ratio of tax payments to total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the 










































*** indicates significance at the 1 % level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
Debt Like Issuers 
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Consistent with the predictions of the risk-shifting hypothesis of Green (1984) 
and Brennan and Schwartz (1988), valuation errors in common equity at the time of the 
security issuance do not matter for the debt-like issuer. LTSVP3 is insignificant. 
The valuation effects in the full sample are insignificant and seem to be dominated by the 
debt-like issuers. 
The results do not find support for the market timing hypothesis of convertible 
debt, predicting that equity is overvalued relative to its intrinsic value at the file/issue 
date and systematic overvaluation is expected. This evidence seems to contradict the 
findings of Mann et al. (1999) and the LRS (1999). Mann et al. find a positive, 
significant relationship between the return on common equity and the issuance of 
convertible debt, while LRS report that convertible debt issuers experience significant 
positive excess returns for the eleven months prior to the security offering. 
3. The Independent Variables: Additional Considerations 
As mentioned before, market-to-book value is often used as a measure of firm 
valuation. Since this study uses market-to-book as a risk proxy and employs the residual 
income model to compute the valuation measure LTSVP3 it is of interest to see what the 
correlation is between market-to-book ratios and LTSVP3. Table XV shows the 
correlation between the dependent and all the independent variables. The correlation 
between the market-to-book ratio and LTSVP3 is 0.05 and not significant. This appears 
to be consistent with the Lee et al. (1999) finding that a valuation measure based on 
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earnings and time varying interest rates is a better proxy for firm value than the market-
to-book ratio.36 
Another interesting, but potentially troublesome observation is the correlation 
between the risk neutral probability of conversion and the market level of interest rate 
(0.47, p-value <0.01). The market level of interest rate plays a very important role in the 
calculation of the dependent variable therefore the parameter estimates of regression 
equations (14) and (15) may be distorted when the market level of interest rate is 
included as a control variable into the estimated regression model. To see the effect of 
inclusion of the level of interest rate as a control variable into equation (14) and (15), 
both equations are also estimated without the market level of interest rate at the file/issue 
date.37 
4. Multivariate Analysis: Debt-Like and Equity-Like Issuers 
Table XVI reports the parameter estimates and heteroskedastic consistent p-
values for regression equations (14) and (15). Models la and lb estimate the sample of 
firms that substitute convertible debt for straight debt as assumed by the risk-shifting and 
the market timing hypotheses. The difference between the two models is determined by 
the credit rating dummy variable used in the estimation. The results appear to be robust 
to the choice of credit rating variable. 
36 As a test of robustness LTSVP3 is regressed on the market-to-book ratio. The residuals are used to re-
estimate the regressions in tables XIV and XVI. Using the orthogonalized measure ofLTSVP3 did not 
significantly change any of the results. However, the explanatory power ofLTSVP3 increased slightly, 
while the explanatory power of the market-to-book ratio decreased. 
37 Another approach for avoiding these potential problems has been taken by utilizing the conversion 
premium of the bond as an alternative measure for the dependent variable. However, I did abandon this 
approach for two reasons. First, the correlation between the probability of conversion and the conversion 
premium is positive but very weak. Second, although the signs of the coefficients are similar in the re-
estimated models, the explanatory power of the independent variables is reduced and the R-squared of the 








Table XV provides the correlations between the dependent and all the independent variables for a sample of firms issuing U.S. non-financial convertible debt 
during the period from 1971 to 1998. P-values are in parentheses. Prob is the risk natural probability of conversion. TSVP3 is computed as SVP3 divided by 
AVG12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic 
value. SPRC is the prevailing market price computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file or issue date if the file date is not available. AVG12rly is 
the average of the SVP3 ratios in relative year -1 and -2. Sprice is the closing stock price prior to the issue date. LTSVP3 is the log of TSVP3. Size is net 
revenue at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date scaled by total assets (D6). MB is market-to-book value calculated as total assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity scaled by total assets ((D6-D60)+( d24*D25))/D6. Divrat is the dividend payout ratio (D26/D58). Intang is intangibles scaled 
by total assets (D33/D6). FC is free cash flow scaled by total assets (D123+Dl25-D127-Dl28)/D6. Debtrat is long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets 
(D6). Rating is a dummy variable for the firm's credit rating according to Standard and Poors. The value of lis assigned to the highest credit rating and the value 
of9 to the lowest credit rating. Taxpmt is the ratio of tax payments to total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date. Irate is the market level of 
interest rate at the file issue date proxied by the 10-year Treasury Bond. 
Variable Prob TSVP3 LTSVP3 Size MB Intang FC Divrat Debtrat Taxpmt Irate Rating 
Prob 1.00 
TSVP3 -0.14 1.00 
(<0.01) 
LTSVP3 -0.05 0.84 1.00 
(0.33) (<0.01) 
Size 0.13 -0.11 -0.07 1.00 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.16) 
MB -0.03 0.17 0.05 -0.03 1.00 
(0.51) (<0.01) (0.36) (0.62) 
Intang -0.05 0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.02 1.00 
(0.34) (0.14) (0.17) (0.09) (0.65) 
FC 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.28 0.06 0.16 1.00 
(0.75) (0.28) (0.68) (<0.01) (0.27) (<0.01) 
Divrat -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.18 -0.03 -0.06 1.00 
(0.34) (0.22) (0.52) (0.60) (<0.01) (0.60) (0.29) 
Debtrat 0.02 -0.13 -0.14 -0.19 -0.37 -0.01 -0.19 0.03 1.00 
(0.76) (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.89) (<0.01) (0.52) 
Taxpmt 0.26 -0.11 -0.10 0.26 0.44 -0.06 0.34 -0.17 -0.33 1.00 
(<0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.26) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Irate 0.47 -0.15 -0.15 0.13 -0.06 -0.18 -0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.20 1.00 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (<0.01) (0.15) (0.82) (0.04) (<0.01) 
Rating -0.15 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.20 -0.09 0.15 -0.12 0.004 1.00 
(<0.01) (0.80) (0.43) (0.07) (0.70) (0.49) (<0.01) (0.11) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.94) 
The implication of the risk-shifting hypothesis of Green (1984) and Brennan and 
Schwartz (1988) is that valuation errors in common equity at the file/issue date have no 
significant impact on the decision to issue convertible debt. Therefore, if the risk-shifting 
hypothesis holds, valuation errors in common equity should be insignificant. Thus, no 
systematic over- or under-valuation is expected to be present (H1). Consistent with the 
risk-shifting hypothesis LTSVP3 is insignificant.38 In addition, the control variables size, 
market-to-book, and credit rating are negative and significant. The tax shield benefit is 
positive and significant at the ten-percent level. The credit rating variable provides 
additional evidence for risk-shifting. The lower the firm's credit rating, i.e. the riskier the 
firm, the less likely the convertible bond will be converted into common equity. 
Therefore, the issue may be more like a debt-like instrument. The sign for size is more 
difficult to explain. In general, investments in smaller firms are perceived to be riskier 
then those in larger firms. Therefore, consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis, one 
would expect the sign on the size variable to be positive instead of negative. The 
potential tax benefit is positive and significant at the five-percent level indicating the 
higher the tax shield benefit the less debt-like the convertible debt issue. This result is 
congruent with findings ofLRS (1999) who report that debt-like issuers have lower tax 
benefits than those issuing straight debt. 
The results in models 1 a and 1 b do not provide evidence in favor of the market 
timing hypothesis which asserts that equity is overvalued relative to its intrinsic value at 
the file/issue date and systematic overvaluation is expected to be present (H3). Evidence 
38 I realize that an insignificant finding is a failure to reject and cannot be interpreted as an acceptance of 
the null hypothesis. 
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of market timing as reported by Alexander et al. (1979) and Mann et al. (1999) would 
predict a negative significant parameter estimate for the valuation variable LTSVP3. 
Model 2a estimates a sample of firms that substitute convertible debt for common 
equity as assumed by the backdoor equity hypothesis proposed by Stein (1992). The 
implication of the backdoor equity hypothesis is that managers want to issue common 
equity, but due to asymmetric information and associated high financial distress costs 
perceive this equity to be undervalued at the file/issue date, hence issue convertible debt 
(H2). The relationship between the probability of conversion and the valuation ratio 
provides empirical evidence for the backdoor equity hypothesis. LTSVP3 is positive and 
significant at the five-percent level indicating the more undervalued the firm's common 
equity at the file/issue date relative to the average valuation of the previous two years, the 
more likely the issue is a substitute for common equity. Four of the control variables are 
also significant. Consistent with the backdoor equity hypothesis, free cash flow has a 
negative sign and is significant at the one-percent level. Availability of free cash flow is 
an indicator of the company's ability to service its current financial obligations. For firms 
with high financial distress costs, i.e., low free cash flow, the bond is more likely to be 
converted into common equity. Therefore, the issue may be more an equity-like 
instrument. The market-to-book ratio and potential tax benefits are also significant. The 
lower the market-to-book ratio the more likely the convertible debt issue is converted into 
common equity. Inconsistent with the backdoor equity hypothesis, this would indicate 
that firms with low asymmetric are more likely to substitute convertible debt for common 
equity. However, its significance is very weak (p-value 0.10), and when orthogonalizing 
the valuation measure LTSVP3 to the market-to-book ratio (see footnote 34) its 
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significance disappears completely. The larger the tax benefits of debt, the more equity-
like the issuer. Again, this result is similar to findings of LRS (1999) who report that that 
equity-like issuers of convertible debt do have higher tax shields than firms issuing 
common equity. One way to interpret this finding is that firms may issue convertible 
debt in order to make use of their tax shields. The market level of interest rates is 
significant at the one-percent level and has a positive sign. The higher the market level 
of interest rate at the file/issue date, the more equity-like the issuer. This might indicate 
that firms that are more likely to convert the bond into common equity might design the 
convertible bond so that conversion into common equity is possible as soon as the cost of 
interest payments on the bond exceed the cost of adverse selection. 
To test if the inclusion of the market level of interest as an independent variable in 
the regressions distort the results as discussed above, the equations are also estimated 
with the market level of interest rate omitted. Models le and ld report the parameter 
estimates and p-values for the debt-like sample. The results are not really surprising 
since interest rate did not have any significant explanatory power in the first model. The 
exclusion of the level of interest rate from the model does not change the results and 
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Table XVI 
Cross-sectional Regression Results 
Table XVI provides the estimates from ordinary least square regressions with heteroskedastic consistent p-
values. The dependent variable is the risk neutral probability of conversion (prob). Regression 
Coefficients are reported with p-values in parentheses. TSVP3 is computed as SVP3 divided by 
AVG12rly. SVP3 is defined as the intrinsic value of the share price divided by SPRC using the 3-year 
residual income model (RIM) to calculate the intrinsic value. SPRC is the prevailing market price 
computed as an arithmetic two-day average prior to the file date or issue date when file date is not 
available. A VG12rly is the average of the SVP3 ratios in relative year-I and-2. Sprice is the closing 
stock price prior to the file/issue date. LTSVP is the natural logarithm of TSVP3. Size is net revenue at 
the fiscal year end prior to the file/issue date scaled by total assets (D6). MB is market-to-book value 
calculated as total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity scaled by total assets 
((D6-D60)+(d24*D25))/D6. Divrat is the dividend payout ratio (D26/D58). Intang is intangibles scaled 
by total assets (D33/D6). FC is free cash flow scaled by total assets (Dl23+Dl25-D127-Dl28)/D6. 
Debtrat is long-term debt (D44+D9) divided by total assets (D6). Rating is a dummy variable for the firm's 
credit rating according to Standard and Poors. InvRating is a dummy variable for the firm's credit rating 
according to Standard and Poors. The value of lis assigned to bond ratings 'BBB' or higher and zero 
otherwise. The value of lis assigned to the highest credit rating available and the value of 9 is assigned to 
the lowest credit rating available. Taxpmt is the ratio of tax payments to total assets at the fiscal year end 
prior to the file/issue date. Irate is the market level of interest rate at the file issue date proxied by the 10-
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the R2 remain the same at 0.08 for model le and 0.09 for model ld. In model 2a the 
market level of interest rate is significant at the one-percent level. However, excluding 
the variable in model 2b does not change the significance of the key variable LTSVP3. 
In addition, market-to-book, free cash flow and tax payments are also still significant and 
show the same sign. The p-value for size changes from 0.16 to 0.10 and R2 drops by 8 
percent (from 0.25 to 0.17). It is apparent that the results of model la, lb, and 2a are not 
driven by the relatively strong relationship between the dependent variable and the 
market level of interest rate. 
E. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the theoretical reasons for the issuance 
of convertible debt securities. Previous studies analyzing the convertible debt security 
choice mostly utilize methods in which they compare convertible debt to straight debt 
and common equity. This study instead employs an innovative method using valuation 
errors at the time of the security file/issue date to test the risk-shifting hypothesis, the 
backdoor equity hypothesis, and the timing hypothesis of convertible debt, using a 
sample of 408 firms issuing convertible debt during the period 1971 to 1998. The 
residual income model is utilized to determine the firm's intrinsic value at the file/issue 
date. This value is then compared to the market value of common equity to determine the 
level of misvaluation. The conjecture is that levels of equity valuation within the 
convertible debt sample might vary significantly among debt-like and equity-like 
convertible debt issuers because of different underlying reasons determining the security 
choice. A method developed by LRS (1999) is utilized to distinguish between 'debt-like' 
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issuers and 'equity-like' issuers of convertible debt, i.e. firms substituting convertible debt 
for straight debt or for common equity. This study finds support for the risk-shifting and 
backdoor equity hypotheses of convertible debt, but provides no evidence for the market 
timing hypothesis. 
Consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis of Green (1984) and Brennan and 
Schwartz (1988), the value of equity at the file/issue date has no significant impact 
explaining the security decision choice for issuing firms that substitute convertible debt 
for straight debt. In addition, the higher the risk level of the firm as measured by the 
market-to-book ratio and credit rating the more likely the issue is a substitute for straight 
debt. This indicates that the primary concern of the debt-like issuers of convertible debt 
is to mitigate the higher cost of debt associated with firm specific risk and agency 
problems. The results however, do not find support for the market timing hypothesis of 
convertible debt, predicting that equity is overvalued relative to its intrinsic value at the 
file/issue date and systematic overvaluation is expected. 
Consistent with the backdoor equity hypothesis of Stein (1999), firm value at the 
file/issue date does have significant influence explaining the security decision choice. 
The more undervalued the firm's common equity relative to the average valuation for the 
previous two years prior to the file/issue date, the more likely the issue is a substitute for 
common equity. Managers who perceive the equity of the firm to be undervalued at the 
file/issue date issue convertible debt rather than common equity. 
Further examination of the alternative hypotheses could be provided by tracking 
the convertible debt issues after the issue date and examine the characteristics of a sample 
of firms that actually convert to common equity and a sample of firms that do not 
110 
convert. First, one would possibly get more insight in the motivations driving the 
convertible debt security decision choice. Second, it could provide a test of how well the 
risk neutral probability of conversion performs as a metric for dividing convertible debt 
issuers into firms that substitute convertible debt for common equity and those that 
substitute convertible debt for straight debt. 
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